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For 150 years, judges and legal scholars said that the Texas pleading
system came from Spain. They explained that Mexico used a simple Span-
ish pleading system that English-speaking immigrants to Mexican Texas
liked more than the complicated procedure they had known in the United
States. After separating from Mexico, the story goes, Texas retained the
Spanish system.
But that story is probably wrong. The Republic of Texas enacted its first
pleading law in 1836. It does not look like Spanish pleading laws; it looks
like an 1824 law written by Stephen F. Austin for his colony’s alcalde
courts. Austin’s law looks like an 1805 Louisiana law written by Edward
Livingston. The Austin and Livingston laws use the words of English
equity.
The story does not end there, however. Equity and Spanish pleading are
related. And Livingston was influenced by Jeremy Bentham, who admired
the simplified judicial procedures of the Arab al-qadi, an ancient judicial
office that became the alcalde of Spain, Mexico, and Texas. Above all,
Austin and Livingston liked Spanish law and tried to conform their laws to
its principles out of sincere respect for Hispanic culture and institutions. So,
Texas pleading law is partly Spanish, even if it came from England.
Joseph McKnight published more research on the origin of Texas law
than anyone else. His scholarship was the key to understanding the true
origin of Texas pleading.
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I. INTRODUCTION
PLEADING is the way people begin to complain about each otherin court. The arguments they make in pleadings are usually theonly ones they are allowed to make at trial and on appeal. Those
arguments are also the only ones that judges are typically allowed to con-
sider before deciding who will win or lose. Pleading therefore determines
where justice will begin and, often, where it will end.
That makes pleading very important. It is so fundamental to the order-
ing of law and society that a system of pleading tends to reveal important
legal values of the culture that uses it. For example, countries in continen-
tal Europe use a legal system called the “civil law,” which is based on the
law of the late Roman Empire (the name “civil law” is not related to the
distinction between criminal and civil law; it is about the ius civile—law
for the people of Rome—rather than the ius gentium—the law of man-
kind). Spain uses the civil law, as do countries like Mexico that were part
of its empire. The civil law pleading system of Spain and Mexico is fa-
mously simple, as a centrally-designed plan intended for uniform use
across a vast empire probably should be. England and most of the United
States tend to use the common law, which is based on Norman-French
law and English judicial custom, with a few other legal sources thrown in.
The common law pleading system is notoriously complex, as a procedure
cobbled together by judges on a case-by-case basis for centuries would
be. England and the United States also have a legal system called equity,
which was developed to solve legal problems that the common law could
not. Equity has its own pleading system.
Texas legal culture is a mix of the civil law, common law, and equity. It
was a civil law jurisdiction under Spain for 300 years, but when Mexico
became independent in 1821, thousands of English-speaking immigrants
settled in Texas, bringing their experiences with the common law and eq-
uity with them. In 1836, the Republic of Texas enacted a pleading law that
has long been considered a civil law system, a survivor of the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to Mexico to independent Texas. But that conclu-
sion is based almost entirely on a just-so story: the Spanish pleading sys-
tem is simple, while the common-law system is not. English-speaking
immigrants to Mexican Texas liked the simple Spanish pleading system
and, when they took Texas from Mexico, the story goes, they took Mex-
ico’s Spanish pleading system with them.
All available evidence suggests that this story is false. Luckily, the true
story is better, with interesting characters like a disgraced mayor of New
York City, an eccentric English philosopher, an ancient Arab judicial of-
ficer, and authors like Shakespeare and Dante.
Naturally, Joseph McKnight wrote more about the origin of Texas
pleading than anyone else. He concluded that Texas pleading came from
Spain, but a footnote in one of his articles noted some similarities be-
tween Austin’s law and Livingston’s law. Professor McKnight’s footnote
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has allowed us to reexamine his conclusion and write a new account of
the origin of Texas pleading.
II. THE TRADITIONAL STORY: TEXAS PLEADING CAME
FROM SPAIN
The traditional story of the origin of Texas pleading is partly true. Mex-
ico did retain Spanish law when it separated from Spain in 1821.1 Texas
was a part of Mexico, so Spanish law governed Mexican Texas.2 Mexico
began replacing bits and pieces of Spanish law by legislative enactment
soon after it separated from Spain, but the old law remained in force
unless changed by statute. Spanish pleading law is one of the laws that
Mexico retained.3
It is also true that the Spanish pleading system consisted of a simple
petition and answer,4 while the common law and equity pleading systems
of the United States were formal and complex.5 In 1840, the Congress of
the new Republic of Texas enacted a law to “designate the system of
pleading to be observed in our courts.”6 The 1840 law required that “pro-
ceedings in all civil suits shall, as heretofore, be conducted by petition and
answer.”7 Consequently, the system of pleading heretofore in use in the
courts of Texas was indeed preserved.8
The rest of the traditional story, though, has been conjecture. We have
been told that the Spanish system was ideally suited to the needs of En-
glish-speaking immigrants and the harsh frontier conditions of Mexican
Texas.9 The immigrants thought the simple Spanish pleading system was
easier to use than the common law system back in the United States, so
they enacted their preference in the 1840 Texas law and, it has been as-
sumed, kept the Spanish pleading system for Texas.10
1. Joseph Webb McKnight, The Spanish Legacy to Texas Law, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
222, 226, n.14 (1959) [hereinafter McKnight, Spanish Legacy].
2. Hans W. Baade, Reflections on the Reception (or Renaissance) of Civil Law in
Texas, 55 SMU L. REV. 59, 61 (2002).
3. Joseph Webb McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Proce-
dure, 38 TEX. L. REV. 24, 28 n.18 (1959) [hereinafter McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas
Pleading].
4. SAMUEL HARMAN LOWRIE, CULTURE CONFLICTS IN TEXAS, 1821–1835, at 159–61
(1932).
5. John C. Townes, Sketch of the Development of the Judicial System of Texas, 2 TEX.
HIST. ASSOC. Q. 29, 49–50 (1898).
6. Underwood v. Parrott, 2 Tex. 168, 178 (1847).
7. Act approved Feb. 5, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., §§ 1–37, 1840 Republic of Texas Laws
88, 88–93, 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 262, 262–67 (1898).
8. See, e.g., Joseph W. McKnight, The Spanish Legacy to Texas Law, 3 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 222, 227 (1959).
9. Charles T. McCormick, The Revival of the Pioneer Spirit in Texas Procedure, 18
TEX. L. REV. 426, 428 (June, 1940) (explaining that “[t]he practice under this system ap-
pealed to the robust common sense of the early Texas lawyers. . . . Perhaps also, to borrow
a saying of Holmes, ignorance was a great law-reformer”).
10. Act approved Feb. 5, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., §§ 1–37, 1840 Republic of Texas Laws
88, 88–93, GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 262–267; Edward Lee Markham, Jr., The Reception of
the Common Law of England in Texas and the Judicial Attitude toward that Reception,
1840–59, 29 TEX. L. REV. 904, 909 (1951). Cf. McKnight, Spanish Legacy, supra note 1, at
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A. REASONS TO BELIEVE THE TRADITIONAL STORY
That has been the story since the early days of the Republic of Texas,
well within living memory of Spanish and Mexican rule.11 It is still the
story told today.12 The learning and accomplishment of the people who
have written about this, and the unanimity of their conclusion, tend to
suggest that their conclusion is right.
And their conclusion does makes sense. The simplicity of the Spanish
system seems like the kind of thing that would have appealed to the En-
glish-speaking immigrants of Mexican Texas,13 and the complexity of the
common law system would have probably been the kind of thing they
disliked.14 It stands to reason that, after it separated from Mexico, Texas
chose the system that was simple instead of the one that was not.
B. REASONS TO DOUBT THE TRADITIONAL STORY
But there are holes in the traditional story. Perhaps the biggest hole is
the text of the laws themselves. Judges and professors who have con-
cluded that Texas pleading law came from Spain have not tried to show
that the language, structure, and content of Texas pleading law are like
those of Spanish law.15 A comparison of Spanish and Texas pleading laws
shows that they are probably related, but as very distant cousins rather
than parents and children.
Then there are the barriers of time, distance, and revolution. Spain
ruled Texas for 300 years, but waited over 200 years to plant settlers
there.16 The Spanish governors and military commanders who ruled the
small civilian population of Texas spent the next 100 years writing reports
224–25 (writing that the 1840 Texas law “was interpreted as legislative authority for the
continuation of the Spanish system of pleading,” but also noting that “the act is far from
specific in this regard and makes no mention of defensive pleading).
11. See, e.g., Fowler v. Poor, Dallam 401, 403 (1841) (Chief Justice John Hemphill writ-
ing for the court, holding that pleadings had been conducted by petition and answer in
Texas before the 1840 Texas pleading law).
12. See, e.g., John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to State-
hood, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1089, 1118 (1995) (explaining that the “act passed on Febru-
ary 5, 1840 rejected arcane modes of common-law pleading in favor of simplified pleading
requirements,” and citing McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3,
which discussed the suitability of the simple Spanish pleading system for the “ignorance (or
lack of training) of local judges”).
13. George C. Butte, Early Development of Law and Equity in Texas, 26 YALE L.J.
699, 702 (June 1917).
14. See Stephen F. Austin, Address of the Central Committee to the Convention,
April 1, 1833, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, The University
of Texas at Austin (stating that judges in Texas were ignorant of the law).
15. Instead, they sometimes note the similarity between Texas pleading law and En-
glish equity even as they claim that Texas pleading came from Spain. See e.g., Coles v.
Kelsey, 2 Tex. 541, 552–53 (1847) (observing that “there is a most striking similarity in our
forms to the English bill and answer in chancery, so much so as to leave no doubt of their
kindred origin. They are both derived from the Roman law, out of which grew up the civil
law, which now prevails all over continental Europe with various modifications; ours came
to us through the laws of Spain”).
16. DONALD E. CHIPMAN AND HARRIET DENISE JOSEPH, SPANISH TEXAS 1519–1821,
at 25, 137 (rev. ed. 2010).
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and letters longing for more people, more resources, more government,
and more law that never really came.17 Mexico ruled Texas for just 15
years, and for much of that time, the central government was either in
chaos18 or the isolated Anglophone settlements were in some stage of
revolt.19 Spanish and Mexican Texas was not a wilderness void of law and
culture—it most certainly did have a Hispanic legal culture that has
strongly influenced Texas law to this day20—but neither was it the kind of
settled, peaceful, prosperous, and effectively governed place that could
firmly establish uniform legal practices and pass them on to recent En-
glish-speaking immigrants.EP]
Part of the problem was a lack of lawyers, judges, and law books in
Spanish and Mexican Texas. And that problem was made worse by the
fact that only a handful of the English-speaking immigrants would have
been able to understand the Spanish-speaking lawyers and judges, or
their Spanish law books, anyway. Which is to say that the needs of the
Anlgophone immigrants and the harsh frontier conditions of Mexican
Texas are reason to doubt the traditional story rather than believe it.
To see why, consider the state of the bench and bar in Spanish and
Mexican Texas.
1. Texas Had Very Few Licensed Lawyers and Trained Judges
All judges in Spanish and Mexican Texas were amateurs, even in places
like Be`xar that were full of Spanish-speaking settlers, soldiers, and clergy
who were in regular contact with the cultural centers of New Spain.21 For
many years, there was effectively no alcalde court—a local trial court—in
Be`xar at all; the alcalde court was run by the governor at the military
presidio, rather than a juez in a court of law.22 And when there was an
alcalde, he was often selected because of family ties, rather than compe-
tence. For example, Captain Toribio de Urrutia, the commander of
Be`xar, complained to the viceroy in 1740 that the Islen˜os—recent immi-
17. A sample of these kinds of complaints by Texas leaders early in the period of
Spanish settlement in Texas is in JESU`S F. DE LA TEJA, SAN ANTONIO DE BE`XAR, A COM-
MUNITY ON NEW SPAIN’S NORTHERN FRONTIER 8–11 (1995). For an extended discussion of
the needs and requests of a Texas governor near the end of the period of Spanish rule in
Texas, see FE`LIX D. ALMA`RAZ, JR., TRAGIC CAVALIER, GOVERNOR MANUEL SALCEDO OF
TEXAS, 1808–1813, at 41–60 (1991).
18. ANDRES TIJE`RINA, TEJANOS & TEXAS UNDER THE MEXICAN FLAG, 1821–1836, at
95 (1994).
19. EUGENE C. BARKER, THE LIFE OF STEPHEN F. AUSTIN 199 (1926) [hereinafter
BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN].
20. TIJE`RINA, supra note 18, at 50–51.
21. See Hans W. Baade, Law and Lawyers in Pre-Independence Texas, in CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE TEXAS BAR, 1882–1982, at 241 (State Bar of Texas, 1981) [hereinafter
Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers] (explaining that mastering the Spanish legal system
required formal legal training, and that the largest settlement in Spanish Texas was San
Antonio, which was a typical frontier military outpost, far from the nearest university was
in Mexico City and, after 1792, Guadalajara).
22. GILBERT R. CRUZ, LET THERE BE TOWNS, SPANISH MUNICIPAL ORIGINS IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST, 1610–1810, at 152 (1988).
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grants to Be`xar from the Canary Islands—were a problem because they
selected incompetent alcaldes:
The said Islen˜os govern themselves through two alcaldes whom the
cabildo elect every year from among themselves, and at present the
alcaldes are father and son-in-law, the notary also being the son-in-
law of one and the brother-in-law of the other. . . Those who exercise
the posts often, and at present, cannot read nor write, and they are
so backward politically that they make no progress.23
The problem of illiterate and unqualified judges persisted in Spanish
Texas. In 1783, the Be`xar alcalde arrested a man for adultery. In an offi-
cial report about the case, the governor explained that he had criticized
the alcalde for not charging the defendant according to the requirements
of Spanish law. The governor said the alcalde responded that he “did not
do it because he did not know whether the circumstances were proper for
making [a formal charge], for his profession has solely been that of
merchant,” and there were no instructions in the town’s archives on how
alcaldes were to charge people.24 The next governor of Texas confronted
the same problem. Poverty and illiteracy in Be`xar severely narrowed the
pool of available judges, so “in many years, the staff of justice and regidor
posts” —regidores were town councilors25—“are found in a single family
of brothers and sons.”26
Inadequate judicial institutions were a problem in Mexican Texas, too.
The procedures of the alcalde courts remained mostly unwritten and cus-
tomary throughout the period of Mexican rule.27 Tejanos complained
about the old hombres buenos system of trial by conciliation—basically,
arbitration by amateur referees.28 An article of the 1827 Constitution of
Coahuila y Texas provided that civil trials by jury should be instituted “as
the advantages of this valuable institution become practically known,”
but the state never implemented the article.29
These amateur judges in Spanish and Mexican Texas presided over
cases that were litigated by amateurs. In the whole of northern New
Spain—Texas, Nuevo Mexico, and Alta California—there were no gov-
ernment legal counsels.30 Nor did any university-trained lawyer practice
law in Spanish Texas.31 Lawsuits were supposed to follow pleading rules
through the use of non-attorney pleaders, or procuradores del numero,
23. de la Teja, supra note 17, at 141.
24. Id.
25. Cruz, supra note 22, at 6 n.8.
26. Tije`rina, supra note 18, at 155 (quoting Munoz to the Viceory, 7 January 1792,
NA).
27. Id. at 40.
28. DAVID J. WEBER, THE MEXICAN FRONTIER, 1821–1846: THE AMERICAN SOUTH-
WEST UNDER MEXICO 39–40 (1982).
29. Tije`rina, supra note 18, at 41.
30. Hans W. Baade, The Formalities of Private Real Estate Transactions in Spanish
North America, A Report on Some Recent Discoveries, 38 LA. L. REV. 655, 705 (1978)
[hereinafter Baade, Spanish Formalities].
31. Id. at 702.
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but there were none of those either.32 In 1810, the Spanish Governor of
Texas prohibited the practice of using amateur pleaders and named four
people as authorized drafters of pleadings in the province, but they prob-
ably never had a chance to draft any pleadings.33 There was an escribano,
or notary, in Be`xar from 1731–1757 who did perform some crucial legal
functions like drafting non-contentious legal business, but he was not a
lawyer, and he was never replaced.34 Toward the end of Spanish rule, the
governor accepted the application of a Be`xar resident who wanted to be
an escribano, but he was never actually hired because there was no
money to pay him; the governor appointed a militiaman to perform cleri-
cal legal duties instead.35 Thus, establishing and maintaining Spanish legal
procedures would have been extremely difficult in Spanish-speaking ar-
eas of Texas. Doing so would have been even more difficult in English-
speaking areas, where the people had been long accustomed to a differ-
ent legal culture.36
Certainly, the lack of trained and licensed lawyers, professional judges,
and established procedures was not unique to Mexican Texas. These are
the kinds of conditions that one would expect to find on any remote and
harsh frontier. For example, in the early 19th Century, U.S. Senator
Thomas Benton complained about judicial proceedings delayed in Ten-
nessee due to “trifling errors” and “magistrates without legal knowl-
edge,” forcing litigants to “travel a hundred miles across poor roads to
Supreme Court sittings and then wait for their cases.”37 Some people re-
marked that the legal culture of Spanish and Mexican Texas might have
been more sophisticated than the early legal cultures of American states.
An immigrant to Texas who had previously settled in Missouri wrote Ste-
phen F. Austin, “I beleave [sic] the laws here are as well administered as
they are in Arkansas and perhaps better, and equally as well as they were
when I first went to Missouri.”38
The topic at hand, though, is not whether Spanish and Mexican Texas
had a good or bad judicial system, or whether it was better or worse than
32. Id.
33. Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21, at 242–43.
34. Id. at 243.
35. Almara`z, supra note 17, at 80.
36. Hans W. Baade described a similar problem in Louisiana, which was governed by
Spanish officials under the laws of Spain, but that was full of Francophone people steeped
in French folkways. Discussing whether Spanish marriage law was ever established in rural
Louisiana, Baade wrote that “even as late as 1796, there were only two or three ‘Espan˜oles
pobres y sin instrucciu¨n’ (‘poor and uneducated Spaniards’) at the various posts, according
to Governor Carondelet, so that there was neither the requisite facility with Castilian lan-
guage and law at that level, nor the need to supply the marriage contract folkways (if any)
of a peninsular population.” Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish
Louisiana: A Study in “Notarial” Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1, 58, 75 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Baade, French and Spanish Louisiana].
37. Tije`rina, supra note 18, at 42 (quoting WILLIAM CHAMBERS, OLD BULLION BEN-
TON, SENATOR FROM THE NEW WEST: THOMAS HART BENTON, 1782–1858, at 28 (1956)).
38. Tije`rina, supra note 18, at 42 (quoting Eugene Barker, The Government of Austin’s
Colony, 1821–1831, S.W. HIST. Q. 21, 252 (1918) [HEREINAFTER BARKER, Government of
Austin’s Colony]).
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the one in Arkansas, Tennessee, or Missouri. The question is whether
Spanish judicial procedures were used in Mexican Texas so consistently
and frequently that the judges and lawyers of independent Texas could
have become familiar with them and retained them in preference to the
procedures they had used in common law jurisdictions.
If there had been a bar of licensed Anglophone lawyers in Mexican
Texas, immigrants might have had a chance to become familiar with
Spanish and Mexican legal practice. But only one English-speaking immi-
grant received any kind of government permission to practice law in Mex-
ican Texas. For several years, Thomas Jefferson Chambers tried to qualify
as a letrado, a fully licensed lawyer authorized to argue cases for clients in
court, but he was thwarted by a series of obstacles, a typical example of
which was his failure to have a certificate of baptism.39 Chambers eventu-
ally qualified as asesor general, an office that gave formal legal advice to
lay judges. He was not, however, an advocate in court, and he became
asesor only in 1834, near the very end of Mexican rule in Texas. There is
no record showing that he had an opportunity to perform his duties.40
Chambers resigned after just three months to become the trial judge of a
district court that had been created by law, but that was never actually
established.41
Another immigrant who tried to qualify as an attorney was Samuel
May Williams. He was one of the most successful lay abogados in En-
glish-Speaking Texas, practicing law without training or a license. He
tried to become an escribano but never qualified for the office.42 All of
this suggests that there was, at best, exceedingly little opportunity for le-
gal practitioners to transmit Spanish and Mexican law or practice to the
settlers in English-speaking areas of Texas.
2. Spanish Law Books Were Extremely Rare in Texas
The reason Williams failed to become an escribano was that he could
not study for the escribano licensing exam. He would have had to read a
multi-volume set of Febrero Reformado, but he was told that this book
could not be had, even in Saltillo—the capital city and center of legal life
in the whole of northern Mexico—“por ningu´n dinero.”43 However, not-
withstanding Williams’s inability to buy a copy of Febrero, William B.
Travis managed to borrow four volumes of a related work, probably the
Febrero Adicionado, from a friend on September 6, 1833.44 Travis evi-
dently considered obtaining the volumes to be a notable accomplishment,
39. Stephen F. Austin to Samuel M. Williams, February 5, 1831, Austin Papers, Dolph
Briscoe Center of American History, University of Texas at Austin.
40. Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21, at 246.
41. Id. at 246–47. Chambers probably wrote this law, Coahuila y Texas Decree No.
277, promulgated April 17, 1834.
42. Id. at 246.
43. Id.
44. WILLIAM BARRETT TRAVIS, DIARY OF WILLIAM BARRETT TRAVIS 9 (Robert E.
David, ed. 1966).
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because it merited mention in his diary.45 Febrero was still extremely rare
in Texas for years to come. Chief Justice John Hemphill of the Texas Su-
preme Court wrote in 1843 that he did not have access to Febrero except
for some quotations from it in Louisiana court opinions.46
The lack of written Spanish law was a problem even when Texas be-
longed to Spain. There were no comprehensive repositories of legislation
in Spanish Texas, New Mexico, or California.47 The archives of the Span-
ish governors of Texas contained mostly political, administrative rules
rather than civil legislation and other law.48 This forced leaders in Span-
ish Texas to improvise legislation. In the early years of the 19th century,
Texas local officials routinely filed legal documents that did not follow
any uniform procedure, so in 1810 the governor formulated some basic
rules for preparing land conveyances, preserving legal records, and so
forth, and then circulated them to towns in the province. Within two
weeks, the guidelines were scrapped because they were either ignored or
interpreted so broadly that they were not followed.49
Copies of recent Mexican legislation were sometimes available in Texas
toward the end of the period of Mexican rule,50 but even as late as 1829,
Stephen F. Austin observed that “laws cannot be published in print so
that every man will have a copy of them, and there is no other way but for
the people to come and read the manuscript translations that are in the
office.”51
The vast majority of Mexican laws were bound in Spanish books that
Austin would not have been able to copy out by hand. The Siete Partidas
was the primary source of Spanish law.52 It was an immense, multi-vol-
ume 13th century Castilian compendium of ancient Iberian law.53 Per-
haps the most influential sources of Spanish law in the New World was
the Novı´sima Recopilacion de las Leyes de Espan˜a, a 16th century Castil-
ian law.54 The Recopilacion was an attempt to unify the disparate sources
of Spanish law into a coherent whole, but it was incomplete, non-system-
45. Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21, at 247 (citing Travis, supra
note 44, at 8). Travis borrowed the books on September 6; Williams retained Travis in a
land dispute on October 9. Id. at 45.
46. Joseph W. McKnight, Law Books on the Hispanic Frontier, JOURNAL OF THE
WEST, July 1988, at 79 [hereinafter McKnight, Hispanic Frontier] (citing Scott & Solomon
v. Maynard, Dallam 548, 550 (1843)).
47. Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 706.
48. Id.
49. Almara`z, supra note 17, at 81.
50. Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21, at 247.
51. Stephen F. Austin to Josiah H. Bell, April 4, 1829, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe
Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
52. Peter L. Reich, Siete Partidas in My Saddlebags: The Transmission of Hispanic law
from Antebellum Louisiana to Texas and California, 22 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 79,
81–82 (2007) [hereinafter Reich, Partidas] (discussing the reliance of early Texas judges on
the Partidas).
53. JOHN THOMAS VANCE, THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIC-AMERICAN LAW 94, 100
(1942) (explaining that the Partidas were begun in 1256 and finished in 1265, but did not
come into force until 1348).
54. Id. at 124–27.
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atic, and chaotic.55 The Curia Philippica was a massive 17th Century trea-
tise on civil procedure that would have been a useful source for someone
drafting a pleading law in a former Spanish colony.56 All available evi-
dence indicates that the Partidas and Recopilaciu¨n were extremely rare in
Mexican Texas and were available only in the 1830s.57 There is no evi-
dence that the Curia was available in Spanish or Mexican Texas.58
Nor is there evidence that those sources were available during the first
few years of Anglophone settlement, when Texas was developing a few of
its own legal institutions. In 1826, Stephen F. Austin wrote to Baron de
Bastrop, who represented Texas in the legislature of the State of Coahuila
y Texas. Austin thought there needed to be “a complete digest of all the
laws in force, published in a bound book and generally circulated gratis to
every officer civil judicial and militia throughout the State,” but there was
none.59 Thus, historical evidence indicates that Spanish sources of Mexi-
can law were, at best, extremely rare and difficult to obtain in Mexican
Texas.
3. Few English-Speaking Immigrants Could Use Spanish Legal Sources
Even if Spanish legal sources had been readily available, however, they
would have been hard for the immigrants to use. Almost none of the new
settlers understood Spanish.60 Austin thought that unless laws were trans-
lated into English, the “settlers [would] be totally debarred all access to
courts of Justice, for not one in a hundred understands Spanish.”61 And
much of the Spanish in the law books was so archaic that it would have
been extremely difficult to read—even for the few Spanish-speaking
immigrants.
For example, many of the words in one of the Spanish laws that schol-
ars have identified as a source of Texas pleading—Law 40, Part 3, of Las
Siete Partidas—had very different meanings in the 13th century when the
law was written than they did in the 19th century when English-speaking
immigrants began moving to Texas in large numbers.62 One of the words
55. Id. at 126.
56. IUAN DE HEUIA VOLANOS, CURIA PHILIPPICA, DONDE BREVE Y COM PREHEDI-
OSO SE TRATA DE LOS JUYZIOS, MAYORMENTE FORENSES (Valladolid 1605).
57. Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21, at 247. But see Reich, Par-
tidas, supra note 52, at 81 (citing Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21, at
247–48, for the idea that Anglo-American lawyers did have access to those books prior to
Texas independence from Mexico).
58. See generally Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21; McKnight, His-
panic Frontier, supra note 46; Reich, Partidas, supra note 52.
59. Stephen F. Austin to Baron de Bastrop, November 3, 1826, Austin Papers, Dolph
Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
60. Barker, Government of Austin’s Colony, supra note 38, at 239 (citing Stephen F.
Austin to B.W. Edwards, September 15, 1825, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for
American History, University of Texas at Austin).
61. Stephen F. Austin to Baron de Bastrop, November 3, 1826, Austin Papers, Dolph
Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
62. The meaning of the words are so different, in fact, that there is an entire dictionary
solely devoted to the Partidas and a few smaller works traditionally attributed to King
Alphonse X. See HERBERT ALLEN VAN SCOY, A DICTIONARY OF OLD SPANISH TERMS
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that Law 40 repeatedly uses is fecha, which does not mean in the Partidas
what it has meant in Spanish for the past 500 years: “date.”63 In Law 40,
fecha is actually the Spanish word hecha, meaning “made.”64 The initial
consonant “f” in Latin and Old Spanish became an aspirate “h” in Iberia
around 1500, likely because the speech of pre-Roman peoples of north-
ernmost Spain used the aspirate “h” instead of the sound corresponding
to the one denoted by “f.”65 The phonology of these northern Iberian
peoples accompanied the reconquest south over the peninsula in the late
15th century and eventually influenced the dialects of Spanish speakers in
New Spain.66 There is no evidence that English-speaking settlers who un-
derstood then-current Spanish would have been aware of, or understood,
those linguistic changes. In this way, Law 40 is a reminder that even if
there had been Spanish law books and properly trained and licensed law-
yers in Mexican Texas, and even if the laws on pleading scattered among
the vast volumes of Spanish legal sources could have been identified and
organized into a coherent whole, they might not have been understood.
This was an extremely important problem for continued Mexican con-
trol over Texas. In 1829, Austin wrote that his colonists could be thrown
“into a ferment and create a prejudice against the civil authorities when-
ever they pleased.”67 He explained that “they lack the judgment to dis-
criminate between what is the duty of a public officer, and an abuse of his
authority– This want of judgement arises from a want of knowledge of
the laws by which the persons in office are obliged to be governed.”68 The
fact that the laws were written in a language almost no one could read
was a cause of Texas’s secession from Mexico and limited the develop-
ment of early Texas law.69 Concomitantly, it limited English-speaking im-
migrants’ ability to understand Spanish pleading laws. In 1842, the Texas
Supreme Court observed that legal questions regarding Spanish pleading
left the justices “to find principles and criteria in a language generally
unknown to us.”70  That was just a few years after Texas separated from
Mexico, during a time when the experience of Spanish and Mexican law
would have been recent and vivid to Texas lawyers—unless, of course,
there had not been much experience with it at all.
DEFINED IN THE WORDS OF ALFONSO X (1986) (explaining that King Alfonso, the reputed
author of a dictionary of the Partidas, created Spanish terms to refer to concepts for which
there had only been Latin, French, and Italian terms before; these new Spanish words
would have been difficult for Spanish readers of the time to understand).
63. 1DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAN˜OLA, REAL ACADEMIA ESPAN˜OLA, 635
(1984) (defining “fecha”).
64. 2 DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAN˜OLA, REAL ACADEMIA ESPAN˜OLA, 723
(1984) (defining “hecha”).
65. ROBERT K. SPAULDING, HOW SPANISH GREW, 88–91 (1943).
66. Id.; RALPH PENNY, A HISTORY OF THE SPANISH LANGUAGE, 104 (1991); D. LIN-
COLN CANFIELD, SPANISH PRONUNCIATION IN THE AMERICAS 3 (1981).
67. Stephen F. Austin to Josiah H. Bell, March 17, 1829, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe
Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
68. Id.
69. Markham, supra note 10, at 905.
70. Whiting v. Turley, Dallam 453, 454 (1842).
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And the few experiences that Texas lawyers might have had with Span-
ish legal sources would likely have been frustrating. The Partidas, Recopi-
laciu¨n, Curia, and Febrero were each bound in multiple volumes. This
would have made them prohibitively difficult to transport in Texas, where
there were very few roads and permanent buildings, and the population
was scattered in little farms spread over vast distances. Nor were they the
only sources of Spanish law: in the late 18th century, the laws of Spain
applicable to ultramarine provinces like Texas and Louisiana were esti-
mated to have been scattered across 89 books of 1,543 titles containing
20,335 laws in 23 volumes.71 There was no Spanish pleading code or a
single section of a book discussing procedure. Instead, many legal sources
contributed somewhat different information about various aspects of
pleading, all of which spread widely across several sections of the vast
volumes.72 Therefore, Spanish law would have been hard to use, even if
the volumes had been easily transportable and readily available in Span-
ish and Mexican Texas.
That is not a criticism unique to Spanish law. The laws of English-
speaking jurisdictions were also unorganized, spread across competing,
privately-published treatises on the common law and equity, varying from
court to court and year to year.73 But an English-speaking lawyer immi-
grating to Mexican Texas would have been familiar with common law and
equity principles and would have had difficulty making sense of Spanish
law which, in addition to being written in another language, was scattered
in multiple sources spanning centuries of evolving thought. And the im-
migrant lawyer would not have had much time to try to make sense of it
anyway because rebellion and independence followed so soon after the
advent of widespread English-speaking immigration to Texas.
4. There Was Little Time to Establish Spanish Practice in English-
Speaking Texas
Stephen F. Austin founded his colony of Anglophone immigrants in
1822 in an area that did not have any permanent settlements.74 Within
71. John H. Tucker, Jr., Louisiana, Laboratory of Comparative Law, in AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION PAMPHLET, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 33, 34 n.10 (citing GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND
MEXICO, 102 (1851)).
72. See, e.g., LAS SIETE PARTIDAS DEL REY DON ALFONSO EL SABIO, COTEJADAS
CON VARIOS CODICES ANTIGUOS, POR LA REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA, Tomo II,
Partida III, Titulo X, Ley III, 465 (Madrid en la Imprenta Real 1807); Id. at 379 (Titlulo II,
Ley XL).
73. See, e.g., GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY (1809); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1824); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY PLEADINGS (1838).
74. In 1822, Stephen F. Austin wrote a letter to Anastacio Bustamante, the Captain
General of Mexico’s Eastern Internal Provinces who agreed to let Austin establish a settle-
ment in Mexico. Austin crossed out a paragraph in a draft of the letter. In that paragraph,
Austin wrote that his settlement was the first establishment in a wilderness inhabited by
Indians. Stephen F. Austin to Anastacio Bustamante, May 10, 1822, Austin Papers, Dolph
Briscoe Center for American History, the University of Texas at Austin.
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just 12 years, Austin’s Colony contained so many English-speaking immi-
grants that—in the whole of Texas, not just Austin’s Colony—Anglos out-
numbered Hispanic Texans about five to one.75 Formal government was
not established in Austin’s Colony until 1828, and the trial courts there
had no contact with the appeals courts in Saltillo, the state capital hun-
dreds of miles away.76 By 1833, the first skirmishes in the Texas Revolu-
tion had already been fought, and Texas would separate from Mexico just
three years later.77 All of which suggests that there was very little time for
the Mexican government to communicate, much less establish and en-
force, Spanish pleading practice in English-speaking areas of Mexican
Texas.
The term “practice” here is important. Spanish legal customs were
known for being “subject to loose interpretation and modification accord-
ing to local circumstances.”78 The precise form of trial procedure in Span-
ish and Mexican Texas varied from case to case; it was less a matter of law
than of individual judicial preference.79 This arrangement was known as
arbitrio judicial, and it was a recognized source of Spanish law, on equal
terms with formal law and written doctrine.80 It gave rise to an axiom of
Spanish law: Obdezco pero no cumplo—I obey but I do not comply81—
reflecting an attitude that was intended to reconcile the power of the
crown, which on the frontier of New Spain was absolute in theory but
absent in practice, with the flexible, ad hoc legal practices inevitable in
courts so far away from Spain. This elastic interpretation of law and pro-
cedure had advantages—promoting flexibility and responsiveness to local
conditions, among other things—but it had the disadvantage of prevent-
ing the establishment of consistent Spanish judicial practice in Mexican
Texas.82
That is very different from concluding that Spanish law could not have
influenced later Texas law at all. It most certainly did, and in profoundly
important ways. Spanish law is the direct ancestor of crucial areas of sub-
stantive Texas law, including family law and water law.83 And Texas land
titles are necessarily interpreted according to the meaning of laws, like
those from Spain, which were in effect when the land was first trans-
75. Tije`rina supra note 18, at 23–24. Cf. Lowrie, supra note 4, at 31 (showing that the
ratio was closer to 3 to 1 than 5 to 1).
76. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 217–18.
77. Id. at 384.
78. DE LA TEJA, supra note 17, at 140 (citing Peter Marzahl, Creoles and Government:
The Cabildo of Popayan, HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 54, 636 (1974)).
79. CHARLES R. CUTTER, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN NEW SPAIN 34–35
(1995).
80. Id. at 35–36.
81. Cruz, supra note 22, at 152–53 n.48.
82. CHARLES R. CUTTER, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN NEW SPAIN 35–36
(1995).
83. JEAN A. STUNTZ, HERS HIS & THEIRS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN SPAIN &
EARLY TEXAS 139 (2005) (discussing the influence of Spanish and Mexican law on early
Texas family law); BETTY EAKLE DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW
123 (1959) (discussing Spanish influence on early Texas water law).
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ferred, claimed, or used in Texas.84
But establishing practice is a different matter entirely. It requires the
reception of knowledge and the repeated experience of its day-to-day
use, and it requires this reception and use by a large enough number of
people to render it the habit of the whole. Circumstantial evidence indi-
cates that the period of English-speaking settlement in areas of Texas
governed directly under Mexican law was too brief to allow Spanish
pleading to become the practice of Anglophone immigrants.
III. EARLY TEXAS PLEADING LAW DOES NOT LOOK LIKE
SPANISH LAW
To see whether any particular Spanish pleading law might be the source
of the 1836 Texas pleading law, it is helpful to compare the Spanish law to
the Texas law. Legal scholars have used many different methods of com-
parison to determine the Spanish sources of later laws in non-Spanish
jurisdictions.
For example, Joseph McKnight compared Spanish and Texas venue
laws, concluding that Spanish law was a source of the Texas venue law
because it contained similar language and concepts and was structured in
much the same way.85
Hans W. Baade, a law professor at the University of Texas, had a
slightly different method. He examined Spanish and French laws to trace
the origin of Louisiana and Texas laws, looking for shared language and
concepts between two laws. He also considered circumstantial evidence.
So, if a Texas law displayed “literal borrowings” from an earlier law, it
was based on that law;86 if the Texas law did not display literal borrow-
ings, but its concepts corresponded with the earlier law, then it was likely
based on the earlier one.87 And those conclusions could be strengthened
if, for example, the people who wrote the later law were in a position
where they would have been likely to use the earlier law, or weakened if
they were not.88
Raphael J. Rabalais, a law professor at Loyala University in New Orle-
ans, took another approach. He listed judicial decisions that interpreted
certain Louisiana laws, then noted the nationality of the sources that each
decision cited.89 The frequency with which a particular source was cited in
a discussion of a particular law was an indication of where the law came
from.90
84. Hans W. Baade, Reflections on the Reception (or Renaissance) of Civil Law in
Texas, 55 SMU L. REV. 59, 62–63 (2002).
85. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 39–40.
86. See, e.g., Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n.345.
87. Id. at 688.
88. Id. at 733.
89. Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the Jurispru-
dence of Louisiana: 1762–1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1497–99 (1982).
90. Id. at 1499.
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Rodolfo Batiza, a professor of Latin American Legal Studies at Tulane,
used a very different method. He looked for the sources of the 1808 Loui-
siana Projet by comparing its language with laws from Spanish, French,
Latin, and common law jurisdictions. The 1808 Projet was written in
French, but Louisiana law had been almost entirely Spanish up to that
time.91 Professor Batiza noted whether a section of the Louisiana law was
copied verbatim or almost verbatim from, or influenced or partially influ-
enced by, a particular legal source. If the language of the source was not
in French, it could not be considered a direct source. If it was in French
and verbatim, it was a direct source; if copied almost verbatim it was
likely a source. And if it did not share concepts with the Louisiana law, it
could not even be a partial influence on it.92
Robert A. Pascal, a law professor at Louisiana State University who
studied the sources of Louisiana law, criticized Batiza’s system for being
preoccupied with word origins rather than the substance of laws.93 Pro-
fessor Pascal thought that when comparing two laws in order to deter-
mine whether one might be the source of the other, it is a mistake to
focus on the words they share, because although the language of the law
might be borrowed from the language in a Spanish source, it might really
express the institutions, principles, and requirements—which Pascal
called the “substance”—of a French law.94 Pascal therefore focused on
the shared substance of laws rather than their words. But even he thought
common language could help reveal the sources of law.95
Applying each of those methods to the Spanish-language laws that
judges and professors have previously identified as sources of Texas
pleading law, the reader will notice many differences between them, and
a few similarities too. Start with the first Texas pleading law.
In 1836, the Congress of the Republic of Texas enacted a pleading law
providing that it shall be the duty of the plaintiff or his attorney in taking
out a writ or process, to file his petition, with a full and clear statement of
the names of the parties, whether plaintiff or defendant, with the causes
of action, and the nature of relief he requests of the court.96 The 1836
Texas pleading law does not prescribe detailed pleading rules, but it does
establish a pleading system.97 And it has several salient characteristics:
91. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present
Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 13–14 (1971).
92. Id.
93. Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46
TUL. L. REV. 603, 609 (1971–1972).
94. Id. at 608.
95. Id. at 615.
96. An Act Establishing the jurisdiction and powers of the District Courts, Section 8
(Dec. 22, 1836) in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1261.
97. The Texas Supreme Court has explained that the 1840 Texas law requiring that “all
civil suits shall, as heretofore, be conducted by petition and answer”—the law that contin-
ued the 1836 Texas pleading law—was “evidently not intended to prescribe the rules, but
to designate the system of pleading to be observed in our courts.” Underwood v. Parrott, 2
Tex. 168, 178 (1847). “The words ‘petition and answer,’” the Court explained, “being used
in opposition to ‘the common law system of pleading,’ not to signify the stages of pleading
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(1) it is very short, (2) it involves taking out a writ or process, (3) it re-
quires that a petition be filed, and (4) it must have a full and clear state-
ment containing the names of the parties, the causes of action, and the
nature of the relief requested.
To determine whether the 1836 Texas pleading law came from Spain,
compare it to each of the Spanish laws that scholars have previously iden-
tified as its source.
A. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, PARTIDA III, TITULO X, LEY III
Joseph McKnight thought “the law of Spain with respect to commenc-
ing of civil suits by a simple petition and answer as laid down in Las Siete
Partidas became a permanent part of the law of Texas.”98 He concluded
that the relevant source of the Texas petition-and-answer system of
pleading was Law 3, Title 10, Part 3 of the Partidas. Here is Law 3, ac-
companied by Professor McKnight’s English translation and the 1836
Texas pleading law:
Law 3 in Spanish Law 3 in English 1836 Texas Pleading Law
Comenzamiento et raiz de The commencement and It shall be the duty of the
todo pleyto sobre que debe foundation of every cause plaintiff or his attorney in
seer dado juicio, es quando upon which judgment ought taking out a writ or process,
entran en e`l por demanda et to be rendered, are the peti- to file his petition, with a
por repuesta ante el judg- tion and answer, presented full and clear statement of
ador: et esto se debe facer to the judge. And this is the names of the parties,
en esta manera mostrando done by the plaintiff making whether plaintiff or defen-
el demandador su demanda the demand either verbally dant, with the causes of
por palabra u¨ por escripto, or in writing, in the manner action, and the nature of
segunt deximos desuso en we have explained in those relief he requests of the
las leyes que fablan de los laws which speak of plaintiff court.101
demandadores et de los and defendant, and defen-
demandados, et dant answering the claim
respondiendo el demandado yea or nay.100
a` aquella demanda llana-
mente si u¨ non.99
Professor McKnight did not compare the language of the Law 3 and
the 1836 Texas pleading law; he simply expressed his learned conclusion
that the former was a source of the latter. However, applying the method
to which these words give name, but to designate the system to which they belong.” Id. The
Court continued, “These words, then, were not intended as a restriction or limitation of the
pleadings to the answer, but as the designation of a system of pleadings – that being the
subject present to the mind of the legislature, who were not treating of a declaration or
plea, or of a petition or answer, but of the remedial systems in which those terms are
employed.” Id. at 178–79.
98. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28.
99. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS DEL REY DON ALFONSO EL SABIO, COTEJADAS CON VARIOS
CODICES ANTIGUOS, POR LA REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA, Tomo II, Titulo X, Ley
III, 465 (Madrid en la Imprenta Real 1807) (c. 180 words removed in order to quote only
the part of Law 3 that is relevant).
100. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28.
101. Act approved Dec. 22, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., §8, 1836–37 Repub. Tex. Laws 198,
201, in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1258, 1261.
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that he used on Spanish and Texas venue law to compare Spanish and
Texas pleading law reveals several important differences between Law 3
and the 1836 Texas pleading law.
Although both laws are about pleading, and they both discuss the
plaintiff, defendants, and submitting petitions to a court, Law 3 is differ-
ent from the Texas law in that: (1) it is much longer than the Texas law,
(2) it does not mention taking out a writ or process, and (3) it does not
require that a petition have a full and clear statement containing the
names of the parties, the causes of action, and the nature of the relief
requested. The laws are conceptually related in only the most general
way; they are not structured similarly, and they do not have any language
in common. Under Professor McKnight’s method for finding Spanish
sources of Texas law, the 1836 Texas pleading law does not appear to
have come from Law 3 of the Partidas.
The result would be the same under other law professors’ methods of
determining the origin of laws in old Spanish jurisdictions. There are
none of the “literal borrowings” or shared concepts that would be needed
to pass Professor Baade’s test;102 no known Texas case has cited Law 3, so
it would fail Professor Rabalais’s criteria;103 there is no verbatim or near-
verbatim language, so it would not meet Professor Batiza’s require-
ments;104 and Law 3 and the 1836 Texas pleading law would probably not
have enough substance in common for Professor Pascal.105 McKnight,
Baade, Rabalais, Batiza, and Pascal assign different levels of importance
to different factors, but they all engaged in fundamentally the same exer-
cise: looking for similarities between laws that might be the sources of
other laws. Having looked for similarities between Law 3 of the Partidas
and the 1836 Texas pleading law, the two do not appear to be related.
B. NOVI´SIMA RECOPILACION, 1502 ORDINANCE OF
FERDINAND AND ISABELLA
Professor McKnight also thought a 1502 ordinance of Ferdinand and
Isabella found in the Novı´sima Recopilacion was a source of Texas plead-
ing.106 The 1502 ordinance provides in part:
102. Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n. 345.
103. Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1497–99.
104. Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14.
105. Pascal, supra note 92, at 608–15.
106. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28 n. 19.
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1502 Ordinance in Spanish 1502 Ordinance in English
Ordenamos y mandamos, que a´ntes que al We order and send a letter of formal
actor, que viene al nuestro Consejo, u¨ a´ notice, that before the plaintiff comes to
qualquier de nuestras Audiencias a´ mover our Council or any of our Audiences to
pleyto, se le de´ carta de emplazamiento, si press his lawsuit, if he comes in person, he
viniere en persona, haya de presentar su must present his lawsuit and set his Court
demanda, y poner su caso de Corte: y si case: and if he thinks he can prove his
entiende que puede probar su demanda claim with docu-ments, then present them
por escrituras, las presente luego con la with the Court case information: and if he
informacion de caso de Corte; y si no has no documents, make an oath, that he
tuviere escrituras, haga juramento, que believes and understands that he has wit-
cree y entiende quetiene testigos con que nesses with which he can prove his claim
puede probar su demanda107
The 1502 Ordinance does mention petitions and plaintiffs, but, like
Law 3, (1) it is much longer than the Texas law, (2) it does not mention
taking out a writ or process, and (3) it does not require that a petition
have a full and clear statement containing the names of the parties, the
causes of action, and the nature of the relief requested. Any connection
between the 1502 ordinance and the 1836 Texas pleading law would be
faint. The ordinance does not appear to be a source of Texas pleading
law.108
C. NOVI´SIMA RECOPILACION, 1348 ORDINANCE OF ALCALA´
Professor McKnight thought another section of the Recopilacion was a
source of Texas pleading law, the 1348 Ordinance of Alcala´. It provides in
relevant part as follows:
1348 Ordinance in Spanish 1348 Ordinance in English
Nos, por abreviar los pleytos, est- We, in order to abbreviate the pleadings,
ablecemos, que en los pleytos que establish that, in the pleadings which may
anduvieren en nuestra Corte, y en las be heard in our Court, and in the cities,
ciudades, y villas y lugares de nuestros towns, and places of our Kingdoms, that
Reynos, que del dia que la demanda fuere from the day the petition is brought to the
puesta al demandado u¨ su Procurador, sea defendant or his Attorney, he answer the
tenudo a` responder derechamente a´ la pleading, by responding directly to the
demanda, contestando el pleyto109 claim
107. 5 NOVI´SIMA RECOPILACION DE LAS LEYES DE ESPAN˜A, LIBRO XI, TITULO III, DE
LAS DEMANDAS, LEY I, D. FERNANDO Y D. ISABEL EN LAS ORDENANZAS DE MADRID DE 4
DE DIC. DE 1502, cap. I, 184 (Madrid 1805) (internal notations and c.540 words removed
after the end of the quoted passage in order to include only relevant language).
108. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 36–40 (finding
the Spanish source law of a Texas venue law by observing similarities in language, content,
and structure); Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n. 345 (finding the Span-
ish sources of Texas mortgage laws by noting shared language, and probative circumstan-
tial evidence); Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14 (determining the sources of Louisiana law by
noting verbatim and near-verbatim language between various laws); Pascal, supra note 92,
at 608–15 (relying primarily on commonalities of substance between two laws to determine
whether one was the source of the other). Nor are there any reported Texas appellate court
cases that have identified the 1502 Ordinance as a source of Texas pleading law. Cf.
Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1497–1504 (identifying the Spanish, French, and common law
sources of Louisiana law by compiling lists of court decisions that cite source laws).
109. 5 NOVISIMA RECOPILACIU¨N DE LAS LEYES DE ESPAN˜A, Libro XI, Titulo VI, De
las contestaciones, Ley I, tit. 7. del Ordenamiento de Alcala´, 192 (Madrid 1805) (18 words
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The 1348 ordinance is about pleading, it mentions the defendant, and it
is short but, like Law 7 and the 1502 Ordinance, (1) it does not mention
taking out a writ or process, and (2) it does not require that a petition
have a full and clear statement containing the names of the parties, the
causes of action, and the nature of the relief requested. Again, this law
does not appear to be closely related to the 1836 Texas pleading law.110
Other Spanish laws, however, might be.
D. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, PARTIDA III, TITULO II, LEY XL
Several law professors have concluded that the Texas pleading system
was based on Title II, Law 40, Part III of the Partidas,111 which provides
as follows:
Law 40 in Spanish Law 40 in English
Libellus en latin tanto quiere decir como By libellus in latin is meant a petition in writ-
demanda fecha por escripto: et esta es una de ing. This is one of the two ways in which a
las dos maneras por que se puede facer, et la suit may be instituted; the other is by words.
otra es por palabra; pero la mas cierta es la But the most certain is that which is reduced
que por escripto se face porque non se puede to writing, as it cannot be changed or denied
camiar nin negar asi como la otra. Mas en as the other may be. In whatever manner the
qualquier destas demandas para seer fechas suit is brought, however, that it may be
derechamente deben hi seer catadas cinco legally done five things must be carefully set
cosas; la primera el nombre del juez ante forth in the petition. The first is the name of
quien debe seer fechas, la segunda el nombre the judge before whom the suit is brought;
del que la face, la tercera el de aquel contra the second, the name of the plaintiff; the
quien la quiere facer, la quarta la quantia, o´ third, the name of the defendant: the fourth,
la cosa o´ el fecho que demanda, la quinta por the thing, or quantity, or amount, or the fact
que´ razon la pide; ca seyendo todas estas which is the object of the suit; the fifth the
cosas puestas en law demanda, cierto puede cause of action. For all these things being set
seer el demandado por ellas en que´ manera forth in the petition, the defendant will know
debe responder, et otrosi el demandador with certainty what to answer, the plaintiff
sabra´ mas certamente que´ es lo que ha de what to prove, and the judge how to inform
probar, et sobre todo tomara´ apercibimiento himself of the whole matter, and to proceed
el juez para ir adelante por el pleyto derecha- in the cause, according to law.113
mente.112
removed before the beginning of the quoted passage, and c. 70 removed after it, to include
only relevant language).
110. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28 (finding the
Spanish source law of a Texas venue law by observing similarities in language, content, and
structure); Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n. 345 (finding the Spanish
sources of Texas mortgage laws by noting shared language, and probative circumstantial
evidence); Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14 (determining the sources of Louisiana law by
noting verbatim and near-verbatim language between various laws); Pascal, supra note 92,
at 608–15 (relying primarily on commonalities of substance between two laws to determine
whether one was the source of the other). Nor are there any reported Texas appellate court
cases that have identified Ordinance of Alcala´ as a source of Texas pleading law. Cf.
Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1497–1504 (identifying the Spanish, French, and common law
sources of Louisiana law by compiling lists of court decisions that cite source laws).
111. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 9, at 427 (quoting the translation from 1 MOREAU
AND CARLETON, THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 57–58 (1820)).
112. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS DEL REY DON ALFONSO EL SABIO, COTEJADAS CON VARIOS
CODICES ANTIGUOS, POR LA REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA, TOMO II, Partida
Segunda Y Tercera, Partida III, Titulo II, 379 (Madrid en la Imprenta Real 1807). It contin-
ues, “And though learned men may well understand what is here laid down, yet as there
are many who cannot, we will explain, with more certainty, how a suit is to be commenced,
either in writing, or verbally. When, therefore, the plaintiff appears before the judge, he
ought to say: ‘before you, Don such a one, judge of such a place, I such a one, complain of
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Like the 1836 Texas pleading law, Law 40 requires that a petition con-
tain (1) the parties’ names, (2) the cause of action, and (3) the nature of
the relief requested. But, (1) it is much longer than the Texas law, (2) it
requires the name of the judge, (3) it does not mention taking out a writ
or process, and (4) it does not require the full and clear statement. Law
40 is likely not a source of the Texas pleading law, because the three items
they both require are described in very different terms, and, of course,
each requires items that the other does not.114 However, Law 40 is similar
enough to the Texas pleading law to permit the inference that they are
related. As we shall see, they are indeed related, but the Texas pleading
law is not a direct descendent of Law 40. The relationship is instead allu-
sive and imitative: the 1836 Texas pleading provision retains vestiges of
laws that intentionally used some of the words and ideas of the legal tra-
dition to which Law 40 belongs.115
E. FEBRERO ADICIONADO
The pleading provision of Febrero quotes some of the oldest language
of that legal tradition, Latin verses that tie Spanish pleading to Roman
procedure. Here is the section on pleading in an edition of Febrero that
could have been the one that Travis used, part of a three-volume set
printed in Madrid in 1818:
Febrero in Spanish Febrero in English
La demanda u¨ libelo es un escrito en que The petition or lawsuit is a writing that
se refiere lo que el actor pretende eo juicio. refers to what the actor intends to claim at
Esta demanda se ha de poner por escrito, y trial. This petition must be written down,
firmar de Letrado conocido. (1) and signed by a known lawyer.
Y contienen los siguentes versos: And should contain the following verses:
‘Quis, quid, coram quo, quo jure petator, “Any orderly petition should include who,
& a que recte compositus quisque libellus what, and before whom justice is sought.”
habet.’116
such a one, that he owes so many maravedis which I lent him, wherefore I pray you to
condemn him to pay me.’ In this manner all suits are to be brought, changing the expres-
sions, according to the nature of the thing sued for.” 1 THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS,
WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, TRANSLATED FROM THE SPAN-
ISH BY L. MOREAU LISLET AND HENRY CARLETON 57–58 (1820).
113. Lislet and Carleton, supra note 112, at 57-58.
114. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 36–40 (finding
the Spanish source law of a Texas venue law by observing similarities in language, content,
and structure); Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n.345 (finding the Spanish
source law of various Texas commercial laws by noting shared language, and probative
circumstantial evidence); Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1497–1504 (finding the Spanish,
French, and common law sources of Louisiana law by compiling lists of court decisions that
cite source laws); Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14 (determining the sources of Louisiana law
by noting verbatim and near-verbatim language between various laws); Pascal, supra note
92, at 608–15 (relying primarily on commonalities of substance between two laws to deter-
mine whether one was the source of the other).
115. See infra Part IV(B)(4)(b), “Livingston’s Law Intentionally Connected Equity with
Spanish Law.”
116. FEBRERO ADICIONADO, O´ Librerı´a de Escribanos, Parte Segunda, Tomo III, Cap.
I, § II, 11-12 (Madrid: 1818) (c. 150 words within the original text of the quoted passage
that are not directly relevant have been removed).
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The provision begins with a brief description of what pleading is and
how it must be done, followed by the number (1), which refers to a foot-
note explaining that the passage is related to several sources of Spanish
law, including Law 40 of the Partidas and the 1502 Ordinance of Ferdi-
nand and Isabella of the Recopilacion.117 The lines beginning, “Quis,
quid” are Latin verses that describe what is known as the libellary plead-
ing system of Roman, civil, and canon law (which is the law of the Roman
Catholic Church), as well as English equity.118
The Febrero pleading provision continues for several thousand words
after the Latin verses, providing great detail about the parties, court, and
claim. It is similar to the 1836 Texas pleading law in that it requires that a
petition be filed that contains the names of the parties and cause of ac-
tion; but it is different because it (1) is very long, (2) does not require
taking out a writ or process and (3) does not require a full and clear
statement. Its substance and language appear to be too different from
those of the 1836 Texas Pleading law in order for it to be a source of the
Texas law.119 However, the Febrero pleading provision’s quotation of Ro-
man pleading does tie it to elements of both Spanish and English-lan-
guage legal sources, inviting the same deduction suggested by Law 40:
that it might be related, somehow, to the 1836 Texas pleading law.
F. LEYES DE COAHUILA Y TEXAS, DECRETO 277
Judges and lawyers have cited one other Spanish-language law as a
source of Texas pleading. In 1842, the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Texas held that the 1840 act “abolishing the common law system of plead-
ing and requiring suits to be by petition and answer, as theretofore” re-
quires that pleadings “are not to be regulated by the common law, but
referred to the doctrines and jurisprudence coming to us through Coa-
huila.”120 John Townes, a former Texas district judge and University of
Texas law professor, concluded that the Supreme Court was referring to
Article 94 of Decree 277, an 1834 law of the Mexican state of Coahuila y
117. Id. at 50 n.1.
118. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS
THEREOF, ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY, OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 19 (1840).
119. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 36–40 (finding
the Spanish source law of a Texas venue law by observing similarities in language, content,
and structure); Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n.345 (finding the Spanish
sources of Texas mortgage laws by noting shared language, and probative circumstantial
evidence); Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14 (determining the sources of Louisiana law by
noting verbatim and near-verbatim language between various laws); Pascal, supra note 92,
at 608–615 (relying primarily on commonalities of substance between two laws to deter-
mine whether one was the source of the other). Nor are there any reported Texas appellate
court cases that have identified the pleading provision of this work as a source of Texas
pleading law. See Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1497–1504 (identifying the Spanish, French,
and Common Law sources of Louisiana law by compiling lists of court decisions that cite
source laws).
120. Whiting v. Turley, Dallam 453, 454 (1842).
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Texas.121 Decree 277 provides in relevant part:
Decree 277 in Spanish Decree 277 in English
Para entablar juicio por escrito, ocurria´ el In order to commence an action by writ-
interesado al juez de la instancia en la ing, the complainant shall present himself
jurisdiccion respectiva, y espondra´ su before the primary judge of the respective
demanda en una peticion sencilla; pero jurisdiction, and shall file suit in a simple
clara. El juez citara´ inmediatamente al reo but clear petition. The judge shall immedi-
por escrito, senalandole dia para contester ately cite the defendant by a written
y es-presando en la citacion el nombre del notice, appointing the day of trial, and
actor, y el asunto o´ materia de la expressing in the citation the name of the
demanda. El sherif notificara la citacion al plaintiff and the subject of the demand.
reontregaudole copia certificada de ella.122 The sheriff shall notify the defendant of
the citation, and deliver him a certified
copy.123
The pleading law in Decree 277 requires all of the information that the
1836 Texas pleading law requires. Perhaps more importantly, the Decree
requires that the peticion be simple—sencilla—but clear. That is not quite
the same as the “full and clear statement” required by the 1836 Texas
pleading law, but it is conceptually similar, describing how information in
the petition must be presented. The Decree also uses some wording that
the 1836 law uses: the former requires a clear petition, and the latter a
clear statement in a petition. These features indicate that the 1836 Texas
pleading law is very closely related to the Decree.124 Circumstantial evi-
dence, however, strongly indicates that, although they are related to one
another, Decree 277 is not a Spanish source of Texas pleading law.125
In the summer of 1835, English-speaking settlements of Mexican Texas
formed a Consultation to plan for imminent war with Mexico and estab-
lish a new Texas government.126 The General Council of the Consultation
enacted a Plan for the Provisional Government of Texas that fall. It sus-
pended all civil proceedings, other than actions on certain writs, until the
121. Townes, supra note 5, at 49 (referring to his quotation of Article 94 of Decree 277
on pages 37 and 38. He also wrote that, “Theoretically, this law remained in force until the
meeting of the Consultation at San Felipe de Austin, on October 15, 1835, and the estab-
lishment by it of the provisional government, consisting of a governor, lieutenant governor,
and council, who were authorized to administer the affairs of state.” Id. at 38.
122. Decreto 277, Articulos 94–96, Secciu¨n 6, De la administracion de justicia en lo
civil, Par. 2–Del Juicio Escrito, in LAWS AND DECREES OF THE STATE OF COAHUILA AND
TEXAS, IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH 265 (Houston, Telegraph Power Press 1839) (internal
notations and a reference to arbitration removed).
123. This is the author’s translation. The English translation in circulation during the
1830s uses the phrase “petition plainly and clearly expressed” instead of “simple but clear
petition.” Id.
124. McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28; Rabalais,
supra note 89, at 1497–1504; Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14; Pascal, supra note 92, at
608–15.
125. See Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 (using circumstantial evi-
dence to help determine the source of Texas mortgage law).
126. PAUL D. LACK, THE TEXAS REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE: A POLITICAL AND SO-
CIAL HISTORY 42–43 (1992).
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General Council of the provisional government otherwise directed.127 On
January 22, 1836, the General Council approved a judiciary ordinance
providing that “courts of justice”—including the Superior Court of Texas,
the court system that Decree 277 had created the year before—”are de-
clared open,” and “the suspension of civil proceedings shall cease from
and after this day.”128 But the courts that Decree 277 declared opened
were never established, and never opened.129 The General Council ap-
proved the judiciary ordinance immediately after it approved a resolution
calling for reinforcements at the Alamo,130 and immediately before it ap-
proved a resolution creating a commission to make a treaty with the
Comanches.131 Accordingly, both the Superior Court of Texas and the
rules of practice that would govern it were vitiated by war and indepen-
dence. Which is to say that Decree 277 almost certainly could not have
been a source of the 1836 pleading law.
Nor was Decree 277 Spanish. There is nothing like it in the Partidas,
Recopilacion, or Febrero.  Two sections of an 1858 edition of the Curia do
use the adjective sencilla to describe pleadings, like Decree 277 does: Sec-
tion 471 refers to “la naturalidad y sencillez que do suyo exige la narraciu¨n
historica” in pleadings, or the “naturalness and simplicity that the histori-
cal narrative requires;”132 and section 474 provides, “Debe, pues, este
libelo ser ligero y sencilla en la narracion del hecho,”133 meaning that the
petition must be light and simple in its narration of fact. However, there
is no record that anyone in Mexican Texas had a copy of the Curia.134
Nor is there a reference to sencilla pleadings in editions of the Curia that
were available in Mexico and Spain in 1834, when Decree 277 was
promulgated. And the references to the term sencilla in the mid-19th cen-
tury edition of the Curia are obscure, extremely small parts of an ex-
tremely long treatise on civil procedure, but the reference to sencilla in
Decree 277 is conspicuous, one of a very few features of a short law on
pleading. If Decree 277 could have used some earlier version of the Curia
as a source, it would probably have included terms that were important in
the Curia and avoided an obscure term like sencilla. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the term sencilla does not perform the function it performs in De-
127. Plan and Powers of the Provisional Government of Texas, Article VI, in GAMMEL,
supra, note 7, at 911.
128. Ordinances and Decrees of the General Council of the Provisional Government of
Texas, An Ordinance and Decree for opening the several Courts of Justice, appointing
Clerks, Prosecuting Attorneys, and defining their duties, & c., Section 1, January 16, 1836,
in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1039.
129. Townes, supra note 5, at 38.
130. Ordinances and Decrees of the General Council of the Provisional Government of
Texas, January 17, 1836 in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1037 (Resolutions providing for the
Troops at Bexar, Section 3).
131. Id. at 1047 ( Resolutions appointing Commissioners to treat with the Comanche
Indians).
132. CURIA FILIPICA MEJICANA, OBRA COMPLETA DE PRACTICA FORENSE, SUMARIO
AL XVI, DE LAS DEMANDAS, § 471, 140 (1858).
133. Id. § 473.
134. See generally Baade, Early Texas Law and Lawyers, supra note 21; McKnight, His-
panic Frontier, supra note 46; Reich, Partidas, supra note 52.
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cree 277. In the Curia, it describes the pleader’s recitation of facts; in
Decree 277, the recitation of facts is written by the judge in the citation,
and it is the petition rather than the citation that must be full and clear.
And those are not the only reasons to doubt that Decree 277 came
from Spain. In the Partidas, Recopilaciu¨n, Febrero, and Curia, a demanda
is a petition,135 but in Decree 277, a demanda is a demand, and a peticion
is a petition.136  Similarly, Decree 277 uses the word “sherif,” which is voz
inglesa, an English term referring to an office in English-speaking juris-
dictions.137 The term is not used in the Partidas, Recopilaciu¨n, Febrero, or
the Curia. Thus, Spanish words like demanda, peticion, and sherif in De-
cree 277 appear to have been chosen based on how similar they look to
common English terms, replacing the terms of art in Spanish pleading
laws.
This conclusion is strongly supported by several other pieces of evi-
dence. First, Decree 277 applied only to Texas, where English-speakers
vastly outnumber Spanish speakers.138 It did not apply to the rest of Coa-
huila y Texas, or to any other Mexican state.139 Uniquely among the de-
crees of Coahuila y Texas, it provided that it should be published in
English.140 And parts of Decree 277 introduced trial by jury and other
features characteristic of common-law jurisdictions.141 Finally, authorship
of Decree 277 has long been attributed to Thomas Jefferson Chambers,
the Alabama lawyer who tried to qualify as a licensed attorney in Mexi-
135. FEBRERO, supra note 116, at 50 (referring to a petition as a demanda, not a peti-
cion). Febrero does not refer to a pleading as a peticion; it uses the word peticin to mean a
request for some kind of legal status or right. See id. at 28 (referring to a peticiu¨n herencia,
or petition of heirship).
136. JOHN SAYLES, PRECEDENTS AND RULES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE
COUNTY AND DISTRICT COURTS OF TEXAS 392 (1893) (noting that the in the civil law, the
“demand was the petition to the judge that he command the defendant to give, to pay, or
to do something”). At the time Decree 277 was written, a demanda could be a demand or a
petition, and a peticiu¨n could be a petition. 1 NEUMANN AND BARETTI’S DICTIONARY OF
THE SPANISH AND ENGLISH LANGUAGES 154, 415 (1839).
137. DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAN˜OLA, REAL ACADEMIA ESPAN˜OLA, Sheriff,
http://dle.rae.es/?id=XM6HUPq (noting that sheriff is “voz. Ingl.,” and defining a sheriff as
follows: “En los Estados Unidos de Ame´rica y en ciertas regions o condados brita´nicos,
representante de la justicia, que se encargade hacer cumplir la ley”). One dictionary pub-
lished near the time when Decree 277 was promulgated defines the term esherif as a
“magistrado . . . de Inglaterra,” 2 NEUMANN AND BARETTI’S DICTIONARY OF THE SPANISH
AND ENGLISH LANGUAGES 491 (1827), but sheriff does not appear to have been a term in
common Spanish usage. Many Spanish dictionaries of the time define the word alguacil,
see, e.g., Felipe Fernandez, A Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages, ALG-ALH
(1817), which was the usual term to refer to an officer of the Hispanic world who per-
formed many of the functions associated with a sheriff of the English-speaking world. . . In
Decree 277, the term alguacil is used to refer to a constable–an office of the English speak-
ing peoples–who assists the sheriff. Decreto 277, Articulo 22, LAWS AND DECREES OF THE
STATE OF COAHUILA AND TEXAS, IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH 257 (Houston, Telegraph
Power Press 1839).
138. Tije`rina, supra note 18, at 23–24.
139. Decree 277, Articulo 140, (April 17, 1834), in LAWS AND DECREES OF THE STATE
OF COAHUILA AND TEXAS, IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH 270 (Houston, Telegraph Power
Press 1839).
140. Id.
141. Townes, supra note 5, at 36–37.
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can Texas.142 There is little more than tradition to support the notion that
Chambers, specifically, wrote Decree 277, but there is lexical evidence
indicating that some English-speaking immigrant did.
Its requirement that a petitcion be sencilla pero clara is exactly like the
requirement that Stephen F. Austin included in his colony’s 1824 pleading
law, that a “petition” state a complaint in “a short but clear” manner.143
This explains the inclusion of the word sencilla in Decree 277 in 1834
much better than an obscure reference in an 1858 edition of the Curia.
All of this evidence indicates that the pleading provision of Decree 277
was not based on Spanish legal sources. Ultimately, all of the salient char-
acteristics of Decree 277—that it shares many features with the 1836
pleading law, that it is not descended from Spanish law, and that it ap-
pears to be related to an 1824 law written by Stephen F. Austin—point
toward the true source of Texas pleading law.
IV. TEXAS PLEADING CAME FROM ENGLAND THROUGH
LOUISIANA
Many conditions restricted the degree to which Spanish law influenced
legal procedure in the English-speaking settlements of Mexican Texas:
the short length of time in which English-speaking settlers lived under
Mexican rule, the language barrier, the distance from courts and other
Mexican governmental institutions, and a lack of legal training and texts
were important limitations on Spanish influence. But all of those factors
pale in importance to this: the Mexican government formally, officially,
and repeatedly decreed that Stephen F. Austin, not Spanish and Mexican
law, governed legal affairs in Austin’s Colony during the years when En-
glish-speaking immigrants were establishing many of the institutions and
practices that the Republic and State of Texas would eventually retain.
A. STEPHEN F. AUSTIN’S 1824 REGULATIONS FOR THE ALCALDES
To understand the development of pleading law from Austin’s Colony
to the present day, it is necessary to review the status of Spanish and
Mexican law in English-speaking areas of Texas in the early 1820s.
1. No Law Was in Effect in Texas When Austin Founded His Colony
In 1821, Texas Governor Antonio Martinez granted Austin permission
to establish a colony in Texas for 300 families from the United States.144
142. Daffan Gilmer, Early Courts and Lawyers of Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 435, 444
(1934). Charles T. McCormick said that Chambers wrote the Decree. McCormick, supra
note 9, at 429–30.
143. Civil Regulations for the Alcaldes, Article 3, in STEPHEN F. AUSTIN, ESTABLISH-
ING AUSTIN’S COLONY, 76 (David B. Gracy, II, ed. 1979) [hereinafter Austin’s Alcalde
Code].
144. Barker, Government of Austin’s Colony, supra note 38, at 225 (citing letter from
Martinez to Austin, August 14, 1821).
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Governor Martinez told Austin that there were no laws and institutions
governing his colony, so Austin would have to make up his own:
You will cause the colonists to understand that until the government
organizes the authority which is to govern them and administer jus-
tice, they must be governed by and subordinate to you; for which
purpose I authorize you, as their representative and relying on your
faithful discharge of the duty. You will inform me of whatever may
occur, in order that such measures may be adopted as may be
necessary.145
Austin wanted to make sure that the governor’s decision was legal, so
he went to Mexico City to lobby congress to pass a law confirming Aus-
tin’s authority.146 While Austin was lobbying in Mexico City, Emperor
Iturbide dissolved the congress and created a junta,147 which decreed that
[U]ntil the government of the settlement is organized, [Austin] is
charged with the administration of justice, settling all differences
which may arise among the inhabitants, and preserving good order
and tranquility, rendering an account to the government of any re-
markable event that may occur.148
On his way back to Texas, Austin stopped in Monterrey to ask the com-
mandant general of Texas, Coahuila, and Nuevo Leon to give him instruc-
tions or copies of laws to help him govern his colony in conformity with
Mexican law.149 The commandant forwarded Austin’s request to the pro-
vincial deputation, which decreed that, until formal government was es-
tablished, Austin had the “power to administer justice,” and that the
“colonists should recognize Austin’s power and obey his orders.”150 The
commandant then sent a letter to Baron de Bastrop, who was at that time
the Mexican commissioner for Austin’s colony, instructing him to tell the
colonists that
Austin is authorized by the government to administer justice in that
district . . . which you will make known to the inhabitants of said
district, in order that they may recognize the said Austin, invested
with said powers, and obey whatever he may order.151
145. Id.
146. Gilmer, supra note 142 at 437–38.
147. HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF MEXICO, THE WORKS OF HUBERT HOWE
BANCROFT 785 (A.L. Bancroft & Co., 1885).
148. DUDLEY G. WOOTEN, 1 A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF TEXAS 1685 TO 1897, at
474 (William G. Scarff 1898) (reprinting the Decree of the Emperor, Andres Quintana,
Mexico City , February 18, 1823).
149. Stephen F. Austin to Felipe de la Garza, May 27, 1823, Austin Papers, Dolph Bris-
coe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin; accord Barker, Gov-
ernment of Austin’s Colony, supra note 38, at 226.
150. Luciano Garcia to Bastrop, July 16, 1823, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for
American History, the University of Texas at Austin (quoting de la Garza’s June 16, 1823
letter).
151. Wooten, supra note 148, at 477–78 (reprinting letter from El Baron de Bastrop to
James Cummings, [Provisional Alcalde on the Colorado] at Castleman’s, August 5, 1823).
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Bastrop did so, issuing a proclamation in 1823 explaining that the gov-
ernor had ordered him “to inform the inhabitants of the Colorado and
Brassos” that Austin
[H]as full powers to administer justice and preserve good order in
the colony until it can be regularly organized agreeably to the consti-
tution and laws of the nation. The Govr. therefore commands you to
recognize Mr. A as invested with the above powers and that you
cause the men under your command to do the same. Obeying his
orders in all things relative to the good order prosperity and defense
of his settlement, and the service of the nation.152
In this way, the Mexican government formally decreed that Austin’s
orders were the law of his colony, and the settlers in his colony were
officially informed of the decree.
Austin responded by promulgating the Regulations for the Alcaldes in
1824. Part of the first draft of Austin’s law survives in the Austin Papers
at the University of Texas. Austin scratched-through text in almost every
section and rewrote it. His edits show that he was not copying laws from
another source, but composing his own as he went along. Austin himself
said that the regulations “were drawn up by me hastily and while I was
subject to continual interruptions and without the aid of any books or
forms or precedents. . . .”153 It is likely that the only reason any part of his
rough draft survives is that he reused part of the paper on which he wrote
it. Austin filled the facing side of the paper with the docket sheet of the
first court to be governed by his laws, and he had to save the docket sheet
because it was an official government record.154 The distinct impression
that these records leave with the reader is that Austin had very few re-
sources, and that the first important legal business of his colony was done
ad hoc, by hand, and without any aid of law codes or forms.
2. Austin’s 1824 Pleading Law Looks Like the 1836 Texas Pleading
Law
Article 3 of Austin’s civil regulations provided pleading rules for cases
in alcalde courts.155 Compare Article 3 to the 1836 Texas pleading law:
152. Bastrop to Colonists, August 4, 1823, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for
American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
153. Stephen F. Austin to John P. Coles, Alcalde of the Brazos, January 25, 1824, Aus-
tin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
154. Civil Regulations for the Alcaldes, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for
American History, The University of Texas at Austin (showing, on one half of a sheet of
paper, a draft of what would become Articles 26 and 27 of the Civil Regulations, and, on
the other half, the 1824 Brazos District Alcalde Court Docket).
155. Austin’s Alcalde Code, supra note 143, at 76.
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Austin’s Civil Regulations, Article 3 1836 Texas Pleading Law
Any person having cause of complaint It shall be the duty of the plaintiff or his
against another within the jurisdiction of attorney in taking out a writ or process, to
an alcalde must present a written petition file his petition, with a full and clear state-
to the alcalde of the proper district, stating ment of the names of the parties, whether
in a short but clear manner the cause and plaintiff or defendant, with the causes of
nature of his complaint, to which the action, and the nature of relief he requests
alcalde will attach a summons in the form of the court.157
following: “Austin’s Colony, District of 1836 Consultation Summons Form
___. The constable of said district is com- To E. P. Sheriff of the municipality of ___:
manded to summons the above-named We command you, that you summons, or
C.D., if to be found in the above district, attach, the body of A. B., so that he be
to appear before me, A.B., Alcalde of said and appear before ___, first Judge of the
district, at my office (or wherever the suit municipality of ___, on the ___ day of __,
is to be tried), between the hours of nine in the year ___, at the town of ___, to
o’clock A.M. and three o’clock P.M., on answer to C. D. in a plea of ___ to his
the ___ day of ___, to answer the above damage and as you faithfully execute this,
complaint of E.F., and on or before that so you will answer. Witness E. F. our said
day this summons and the proceedings Judge of the aforesaid municipality, on the
thereon must be returned to my office. __ day of ___ A. D., __ at the town of __.
Given this ___ day of ____. A.B., F. H., Clerk. Issued on _ A.D.158
Alcalde.156
The 1824 and 1836 laws require a written petition, taking out a process,
and the inclusion of the same information. They even use the same lan-
guage: “clear,” “cause,” “nature,” “stating,” and “statement.” There is far
more similarity between the language and content of the 1824 and 1836
laws than there is between the Spanish-language laws and the 1836 law.
The term “causes of action” is not the same as “cause of the complaint,”
the “nature of relief he requests” is not quite the “nature of the com-
plaint,” and a “full” statement can be very different from a “short” one.
But even these terms constitute multiple, near-verbatim copies of lan-
guage. The shared language, concepts, and structure of Austin’s 1824
pleading law and the 1836 Texas pleading indicate that the former is a
source of the latter.159
Professor McKnight noted that the 1836 pleading law “reiterated” the
requirement in Austin’s law that a legal proceeding begin by a petition
“stating in a short but clear manner the cause and nature of the com-
plaint.”160 Based on the similarities between Austin’s law and the 1836
pleading law, Professor McKnight concluded that “Hispanesque procedu-
156. Austin’s Alcalde Code, supra note 143, at 82.
157. Act approved Dec. 22, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., §8, 1836–37 Repub. Tex. Laws 198,
201, in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1258, 1261.
158. Ordinances and Decrees of the General Council of the Provisional Government of
Texas, An Ordinance and Decree for opening the several Courts of Justice, appointing
Clerks, Prosecuting Attorneys, and defining their duties, &c., Section 1, January 16, 1836,
in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1044.
159. Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n.345 (finding the Spanish
sources of Texas mortgage laws by noting shared language); Batiza, supra note 90, at 13–14
(determining the sources of Louisiana law by noting verbatim and near-verbatim
language).
160. Joseph W. McKnight, Stephen F. Austin’s Legalistic Concerns, 89 S.W. HIST. Q.
239, 250 (1986) [hereinafter McKnight, Austin’s Legalistic Concerns].
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ral law, which was considerably more straightforward than the English,
was perpetuated through Austin’s regulations along with Spanish modes
of trial.”161 To support his conclusion, he cited a series of Texas Supreme
Court cases, none of which explains the court’s reasons for concluding
that Texas pleading law came from Spain, or identifies which Spanish law
might have been the source of Texas pleading law.162 In this way, Profes-
sor McKnight recognized that Austin’s 1824 pleading law was a source of
the 1836 Texas pleading law, but his conclusion that it transmitted Span-
ish pleading law to the Republic of Texas was evidently based on assump-
tions in caselaw.
As comparisons of Spanish pleading laws and the 1836 law demon-
strate, however, there is so little in common between the Spanish laws on
the one hand, and the 1836 Texas law on the other, that the former ap-
pears not to be sources of the latter. Some of the Spanish laws share just
enough similarities with the 1836 Texas pleading law to indicate that there
is a tenuous connection between the two bodies of law, but their similari-
ties in language and ideas are not nearly as numerous or strong as those
between Austin’s law and the 1836 law. Which is another way of saying
that, under Professor McKnight’s method for determining the Spanish
sources of Texas law, Austin’s 1824 law would have qualified as a source
of the 1836 Texas law, and the Spanish laws that he had assumed were its
sources would not. Several pieces of circumstantial evidence also support
the conclusion that the 1836 Texas pleading law was based on Austin’s
1824 law. Consider, first, the longevity of Austin’s law.
3.  Austin’s Pleading Law Was Used Throughout Mexican Rule
Austin wrote his alcalde codes under authority that was set to expire in
1828, when formal local governments, or ayuntamientos, were established
under the 1827 Constitution of Coahuila y Texas.163 However, the
ayuntamientos in English-Speaking areas of Mexican Texas did very little
of the work they were required by law to do.164 And the Mexican govern-
ment never replaced Austin’s pleading rules with state or federal statute
law.165
The alcalde court’s records are not preserved,166 but bits and pieces of
pleadings that relate to land and probate records survive, including an
161. Id.
162. Id. citing Fowler, Dallam 401, 403 (1841); Whiting v. Turley, Dallam 453, 454
(1842), Underwood, 2 Tex. At 178–79 (1847); Carter & Hunt v. Wallace, 2 Tex. 206, 209–10
(1847); Horn v. Texas, 3 Tex. 190, 191 (1848).
163. Barker, Government of Austin’s Colony, supra note 38, at 228.
164. Stephen F. Austin to Josiah H. Bell, March 17, 1829, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe
Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin. In this letter, he wrote that the
“ayto of last year did not comply with the duties required by law in any one particular.”
165. See John C. Townes, Sketch of the Development of the Judicial System of Texas, 2
TEX. HIST. ASS’N Q. 29, 38 (1898) (explaining that the courts created by Decree 277 of the
State of Coahuila y Texas were never opened, which means that the pleading law promul-
gated by the Decree was never in effect).
166. Barker, Government of Austin’s Colony, supra note 38, at 249.
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1833 summons on a petition in a dispute over a decedent’s estate. The
form of the summons is exactly the same as the one that Austin’s alcalde
code required.167 And although the 1836 Texas pleading law does not
provide a form of summons, the 1836 judiciary ordinance of the provi-
sional government of Texas does provide one, and it is extremely similar
to the one in Austin’s 1824 law.168 The 1836 pleading law and summons
applied to newly-created district courts, which were the successor courts
to Austin’s alcalde courts.169 The fact that Mexican and Spanish pleading
rules did not require or provide a writ of summons in anything like the
form in the 1833 case or the 1836 judiciary ordinance indicates that the
civil law pleading rules were not in effect during the period of Mexican
rule. And the striking similarity between the 1836 pleading law and Aus-
tin’s 1824 law, combined with the fact that the 1836 and 1824 laws applied
to the same courts, indicates that Austin’s law was used throughout Mexi-
can rule in Texas.
4. Austin Was Sympathetic to Hispanic Culture and Mexican Law
One of the reasons Austin could write, from scratch, a pleading law
that was approved by Mexican officials—a law which, after it was
adopted in substance by the Republic of Texas in 1836, was assumed by
generations of judges and professors to be a Spanish law—was that Aus-
tin grew up in a Hispanic world. He was raised in Missouri when it be-
longed to Spain.170 His father had taken the oath of allegiance to the
Spanish crown in the late 18th century, and his family lived near St.
Genevieve, which was largely French-speaking but had been governed
under Spanish law.171 Living in the recently-acquired Louisiana Territory
gave Austin an “instinctive, sympathetic understanding” of Hispanic
institutions.172
He served in the Missouri Territorial Legislature in 1815, just twelve
years after the territory had been acquired in the Louisiana Purchase, and
introduced several bills to reform court procedure and the judicial sys-
tem.173 At that time, Missouri retained some elements of Spanish law.174
167. Michael Rugeley Moore, Celia’s Manumission and the Alcalde Court of San Felipe
de Austin, 5 J. TEX. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 38, 43 (Fall 2015) (showing a summons of witnesses
dated May 14, 1833, in the Alcalde Court of the Department of Bexar, Municipality of
Austin in the case of James B. Miller v. John M. Allen).
168. Ordinances and Decrees of the General Council of the Provisional Government of
Texas, An Ordinance and Decree for opening the several Courts of Justice, appointing
Clerks, Prosecuting Attorneys, and defining their duties, &c, Section 19, January 16, 1836,
in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1044.
169. See Clarence Wharton, Early Judicial History of Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 311, 323
(1934) (noting that the clerk of the district court of Brazoria issued an execution in 1837 to
enforce an 1834 alcalde court judgment).
170. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 13.
171. LOUIS HOUCK, II THE SPANISH REGIME IN MISSOURI XXI (1909).
172. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 12.
173. McKnight, Austin’s Legalistic Concerns, supra note 160, at 243–44.
174. McKnight, Hispanic Frontier, supra note 46, at 27 n.34 (explaining that lower Mis-
souri retained some Spanish laws for a while after statehood, and citing cases in post-
statehood Missouri which relied on Spanish law).
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Austin briefly served as a circuit judge in 1820 in Arkansas, which had
also been a Spanish-law jurisdiction in the Louisiana Territory.175 In early
1820, he was living in New Orleans, the old Spanish capital of Louisi-
ana.176 Austin was thoroughly versed in the folk memory of Civil Law
practice.177
When Austin arrived in Texas, he fully commited himself to becoming a
citizen of his new country. “I bid an everlasting farewell to my native
country, and adopted this, and in so doing I determined to fulfill rigidly
all the duties and obligations of a Mexican citizen.”178 He learned Span-
ish well enough to write letters to the Mexican government, and devel-
oped “a sympathetic but very accurate understanding of Mexican” life.179
He called himself Estevan and signed his letters under that name, not just
in letters to Mexican officials, but even to his family.180 And Austin de-
fended the Mexican government time and time again, often at great per-
sonal risk.181 For example, he tried to put down the Fredonian Rebellion,
an uprising in late 1826 and early 1827 of Anglophone settlers around
Nacogdoches, by telling the insurgents: “I will befriend you all so far as I
can consistent with my duty to the Govt but I am a Mexican citizen and
officer and I will sacrifice my life before I will violate my duty and oath of
office.”182
Austin certainly had reservations about the organization and conduct
of Mexican government, but he appears to have sincerely believed that
Mexico’s problems were relatively small, and that they would be sur-
mounted.183 He even told his colonists that the Mexican state govern-
ment was superior to those of the early United States:
The mexican Govt, is yet in its infancy, the Govert. of this State
Quahuila and Texas is as it were just beginning to be, its constitution
is not yet formed, its organization is therefore as yet incipient and
provisional and in such a state of things temporary embarrassments
in the administration of justice are to be expected, they are a natural
consequence, and those who look back to the first organization of
175. Robert L. & Pauline H. Jones, Stephen F. Austin in Arkansas, 25 ARK. HIST. Q.
336, 350 (1966).
176. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 32–33.
177. Even after he moved to Texas, Austin continued to deal with legal and business
affairs arising from his upbringing in old Louisiana. See, e.g., Stephen F. Austin to Henry
Elliot, Agreement to accept a plot of land owned by Sylvanus Castleman in the “Common
Field” of St. Genevieve, Mo., in exchange for debt on Texas land, March 1, 1822, Austin
Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
Castleman was elected the first alcalde of San Felipe de Austin in 1823. Election Returns
for the San Felipe de Austin Alcalde Election, December 20, 1823, Austin Papers, Briscoe
Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
178. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 77 (quoting a letter from Stephen F.
Austin to Samuel Williams, February 5, 1831).
179. Id. at 78.
180. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen F. Austin to James E.B. Austin, December 25, 1822,
Austin Papers, Briscoe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
181. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 195–96.
182. Id. at 196.
183. Id. at 266–67 .
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the State Govts. in the U. S. of the north will probably find more
collision and as much cause of complaint arising out of the delays
necessarily produced by overturning one Govt. and establishing an-
other than can be found in this country besides, the new emigrants in
general are unacquainted with the language and the customs and ex-
isting laws of this country translations of which have not as yet been
furnished owing to the want of time to do it justice and candour
therefore certainly requires that we should not hastily condemn the
whole govt. even altho some might suppose from a want of the nec-
essary information to enable them to judge, that a subordinate of-
ficer had done them an in justice–This Govt will never wantonly do
an act of injustice to any person and the liberality of their policy
towards emigrants is a convincing proof of the wise and broad princi-
ples of Liberty and Justice that govern their councils–184
This was not a ploy to make the Mexican government more generous
and tolerant toward the new immigrants; it was sincere. Austin’s policy
was “founded essentially on loyalty and was shaped by sincere sympathy
for the Mexican people.”185 Until the very end of the period of Mexican
rule over Texas, Austin tried to placate his restive colonists.186
Austin’s sympathy toward Mexico was reflected in the laws that he
wrote. Austin composed a draft constitution for Mexico that retained
many features of Spanish law. In Austin’s proposed constitution, he in-
cluded provisions governing alcalde courts. These were not procedural
rules and did not include rules of court, but were substantive legal provi-
sions, and Austin borrowed them directly from the Spanish Constitution
of 1812. For example, he wrote that “Alcaldes shall be elected in each
Pueblo in the same manner established by the Spanish Constitution and
existing laws,” then listed 14 articles that were to be copied from the
Spanish Constitution. One article provided that “All Spaniards possess
the right, of which they cannot be dispossessed, of settling their differ-
ences by arbitration, at the will of the parties. The alcalde of every village
shall, in himself, exercise the office of conciliator; and he who has to com-
plain of civil and personal injury, shall apply for his mediation.”187 Aus-
tin’s proposed constitution was adopted in substantial part in a
provisional constitution called the Acta Constitutiva, which was the first
form of the Mexican Federal Constitution of 1824.188
Three years later, he attended a trial in the alcalde court of Jose Miguel
de Arciniega at Be´xar.189 The case was tried by two people whom Austin
called “referees,” Jose Antonio Navarro and Erasmo Seguin. All three
184. Austin to His Colonists, January 5, 1827, in EUGENE BARKER, 2 THE AUSTIN PA-
PERS 1571 (Am. Hist. Ass’n 1924).
185. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 281.
186. GREGG CANTRELL, STEPHEN F. AUSTIN, EMPRESARIO OF TEXAS 144 (1999).
187. Stephen F. Austin, Proposed Constitution for the Republic of Mexico, March 29,
1823, Articles 280 and 282, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History,
University of Texas at Austin.
188. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 84–85.
189. Note from Stephen F. Austin, July 28, 1823, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center
for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
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men were towering figures in Texas history. Arciniega came from a family
that had been active in the military and political events of northern New
Spain for generations; Seguin and Navarro were born in San Antonio and
would become prominent political leaders in Mexico and the Republic of
Texas.190 They were not trained lawyers. The referees and the alcalde de-
cided the preliminary matters of the case, and they did so without taking
testimony,191 in a process that was similar to, but not quite the same as,
the Spanish institution of arbitration.192 Austin included an analogous
provision in his Alcalde Regulations.193
Austin’s inclusion of provisions of the 1812 Spanish Constitution in his
draft Mexican Constitution in 1824, and his installation of a conciliation
procedure in his alcalde codes that was similar to the process he had wit-
nessed in a Spanish-language court in Be´xar, show that he was willing to
enact Spanish law when he knew what it was. His adaptations of Spanish
law are also attempts by Austin to keep Mexican law Spanish, and to
make Texas law Mexican, which he likely would have done only if he
were interested in maintaining the civil law tradition of Mexican Texas.
Nor was this interest something that Austin kept to himself. In 1829,
many of his colonists thought that three recently enacted Mexican laws
were oppressive. Austin addressed their concerns, explaining that each of
the laws was not an example of Mexican oppression, but sensible legisla-
tion. He also revealed that he helped make them. “The three measures I
have spoken of—the tax—the vagrants—and the notice to report births
and deaths every three months, were all adopted with my advice and
knowledge.”194
B. AUSTIN’S LAW CAME FROM EDWARD LIVINGSTON’S 1805 ORLEANS
PRACTICE ACT
The facts that Austin was raised in a partly Hispanic culture, that he
proposed Mexican laws that were based on Spanish sources, and that he
publicly defended unpopular Mexican law all tend to support the notion
that Austin might have based his colony’s court procedure on Spanish
and Mexican practice laws if he had access to them. However, the text of
Austin’s pleading law, in particular its form for serving process, is so dif-
ferent from anything in Spanish legal authorities that it invites the infer-
190. TIJE`RINA, supra note 18, at 96 (regarding Arciniega), at 115–16 (regarding
Navarro), at 115 (regarding Seguin).
191. Note from Stephen F. Austin, July 28, 1823, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center
for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
192. Among the many variations between the trial practice and the Spanish laws gov-
erning arbitration, there here to have been a schedule drawn up by a notary public, or
bearing the seal of a notary public, showing all matters in dispute, see LAS SIETE PAR-
TIDAS, TITULO IV, PARTIDA III, LEY XXIII (Madrid 1805) (requiring that a schedule of all
matters in dispute must be drawn up by a notary public), but there was no notary public in
Be`xar, and there was always a shortage of stamped paper. ALMARA`Z, supra note 17, at 78.
193. Art. 9 in Austin’s Alcalde Code, supra note 143, at 77.
194. Stephen F. Austin to Josiah H. Bell, March 17, 1829, Austin Papers, Dolph Briscoe
Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
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ence that Austin’s law could not have come from them. Instead, it likely
came from a very short law written for a new American territory carved
out of the Louisiana Purchase. Joseph McKnight appears to have been
the only person to have noted this.
1.  Joseph McKnight Connected Livingston’s 1805 Law with Austin’s
1824 Law
In 1986, Professor McKnight wrote an article about Stephen F. Austin’s
experience performing “lawyerly functions.”195 He noted that Austin had
been a legislator in Missouri in 1815 and a circuit judge in Arkansas in
1820.196 He also wrote that Austin trained as an apprentice in 1821 to
Joseph Hawkins, a New Orleans attorney.197 Professor McKnight ex-
plained that, although “Austin has left no direct record of his training in
Hawkins’s office, the work he performed there is not hard to infer,” and
observed that Austin would “have learned the rudiments of civil, as well
as criminal, process” during his apprenticeship.198
To support his argument, Professor McKnight noted that two “and a
half years after leaving Hawkins’s office, Austin still remembered the
forms of summons” and other bits of Louisiana law so well “that he could
reproduce them all from memory for inclusion in the Civil Regulations
for his colonists.”199 Professor McKnight noticed that Austin’s 1824 form
of summons was based on a “prototype,” an 1805 Louisiana statute that
was in effect while Austin was a legal apprentice in New Orleans.200
That law was written by Edward Livingston, a former Mayor of New
York City and United States Attorney who fled to New Orleans in 1804
under a cloud of scandal.201 The United States had purchased Louisiana
from France in 1803, but the area had been governed by Spain since 1763,
and the vast majority of its laws were Spanish at the time of the Louisiana
Purchase.202 Livingston was tasked with writing the first laws for the Or-
leans Territory, which was the portion of the Purchase south of the thirty-
third parallel, roughly equivalent to the present state of Louisiana. One
of the laws Livingston wrote for the Orleans Territory included a form of
summons that plaintiffs were to attach to their petitions.203
195. McKnight, Austin’s Legalistic Concerns, supra note 160, at 239–44.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 244.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at n. 25.
201. CARLETON HUNT, ADDRESS AT THE LIFE AND SERVICES OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON
11–12 (1903). Funds that were entrusted to Livingston’s office were missing. This was not
Livingston’s fault, but he took full responsibility for it anyway, and repaid the missing
money several decades later.
202. Rodolfo Batiza, The Influence of Spanish Law in Louisiana, 33 TUL. L. REV. 29,
30–31 (1958).
203. Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orle-
ans, 210, 211 (1805) Laws of the Territory of Orleans Chapter XVI, An Act Regulating the
Practice of the Superior Court, in Civil Causes, Sections 1 and 2, Approved April 10, 1805.
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Professor McKnight did not quote the 1805 law’s form of summons to
explain what it meant, nor did he identify who wrote it. And he certainly
did not argue that the 1805 law was a source of Texas pleading law. Pro-
fessor McKnight simply used the similarity between its form of summons
and Austin’s as evidence that Austin had legal training, which was the
subject of Professor McKnight’s article. But his observation is neverthe-
less the key to understanding the origin of Texas pleading law. His cita-
tion to the Orleans Territory law has allowed his readers to read the
pleading law, compare it to Austin’s, and determine for themselves
whether they look like they are related.
2. Austin’s Law Looks Like Livingston’s 1805 Law
They look very closely related indeed. The summons in the 1805 Loui-
siana law is attached to instructions for pleading in the Superior Courts of
the Orleans Territory. The combination of the pleading law and summons
is nearly the same as Austin’s 1824 pleading law:
Austin’s Civil Regulations, Article 3Livingston’s 1805 Practice Act
Any person having cause of complaintAll suits in the superior court shall be
against another, within the jurisdiction ofcommenced by petition, addressed to the
an alcalde must present a written petitioncourt, which shall state the names of the
to the alcalde of the proper district, statingparties, their places of residence, and the
in a short but clear manner the cause andcause of action, with the necessary circum-
nature of his complaint, to which thestances of places and dates, and shall con-
alcalde will atta[ ]ch a summons in theclude with a prayer for relief, adapted to
form following— “Austin’s Colony, Dis-the circumstances of the case. And every
trict of ___ the constable of said district issuch petition shall be free from unneces-
commanded to summons the above namedsary prolixity, and from any matter scan-
C. D., if to be found in the above district,dalous, libellous, or impertinent, and shall
to appear before me, A. B., Alcalde ofbe filed with the clerk, whose duty it shall
said district, at my office (or wherever thebe to endorse thereon the day on which
suit is to be tried,) between the hours of 9the same is filed. [A]fter filing such peti-
o’clock A. M. and 3 o’clock P. M., on thetion, the clerk shall on the request of the
___ day of ___, to answer the above com-petitioner or his attorney, make a fair
plaint of E. F and on or before that daytranscript of the same, together with a
this summons and the proceedings thereoncitation in the following form: Mr. A. B.
must be returned to my office— Givenyou are hereby summoned to appear at
this ___ day of ___. A.B., Alcalde.205the ___ and comply with the prayer of the
annexed petition, or file your answer
thereto, in writing, in the office of the
clerk of the superior court, at ___ in ___
days after service thereof. Witness C.D.
presiding.204
The 1805 and 1824 laws have much the same language and form of
summons, and they require the same content. Even the 1824 law’s “short
but clear” statement is embodied in the 1805 law’s prohibition against
204. Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orle-
ans, 210, 211 (1805) Laws of the Territory of Orleans Chapter XVI, An Act Regulating the
practice of the Superior Court, in Civil Causes, Sections 1 and 2, Approved April 10, 1805.
205. Art. 3 in Austin’s Alcalde Code, supra note 143, at 76.
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“unnecessary prolixity.” They share language, concepts, and structure.206
Accordingly, Livingston’s 1805 law was likely a source of Austin’s 1824
law.
3. Austin Acknowledged Livingston’s Influence
Circumstantial evidence also indicates that Austin’s law was influenced
by Livingston’s.207 Austin himself implied that it was in 1832, when he
wrote a long letter to Livingston asking for advice on a new system of
land and debt laws.208 The letter appears to have been extremely impor-
tant to Austin. He wrote a first draft of the letter and kept it,209 some-
thing that was unusual for Austin to do: one of the only other draft
documents preserved in Austin’s papers is the partial draft of his Regula-
tions for the Alcaldes. And Austin wrote the letter at a time when he was
racked by anxiety about unrest in his colony and the future of Texas.210
He was a representative in the legislature of Coahuila y Texas, and he was
torn between his loyalty to Mexico—which had begun showing signs of
rejecting the classically liberal settlement embodied in the Constitution of
1824, a law that Austin himself had strongly influenced—and his colo-
nists, who were increasingly dissatisfied with the Mexican government.
Just before Austin wrote the letter to Livingston, the governor had writ-
ten Austin informing him that the legislature passed an urgent resolution
asking Austin to attend the legislative session.211 Austin wrote the letter
in Matamoros, where he had stopped on his way to attend the state legis-
lature in Saltillo.212 Austin’s letter to Livingston mentions Austin’s
thoughts on his colonists’ behavior and the Mexican government’s re-
sponse, and it discusses his misgivings about the Mexican legal system at
great length.
But before it goes into those topics, which weighed so heavily on Aus-
tin’s mind, his letter begins with lavish praise of Livingston’s law codes
and ideas about government and jurisprudence:
You stand before the public in the character of a philanthropist. By
your labors to ameliorate the condition of your fellow citizens in
206. See McKnight, Spanish Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28 (finding
the Spanish source law of a Texas law by observing similarities in language, concepts, and
structure); Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1497–1504; Batiza, supra note 91, at 13–14; Pascal,
supra note 93, at 608–15.
207. Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n.345.
208. Stephen F. Austin to Edward Livingston, June 24, 1832, The Edward Livingston
Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University. The letter is over 2,500 words long.
209. Stephen F. Austin Papers, Briscoe Center for American History, University of
Texas at Austin. In his classic biography of Austin, Eugene Barker quoted from the draft of
Austin’s letter in the University of Texas archives and wrote, “whether he ever sent it we
do not know.” BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 228. We now know that Austin
did send it, and that it was received. The copy preserved in Livingston’s papers at
Princeton indicates that it was also read: someone—apparently Livingston—made margi-
nal notes in several sections of the letter.
210. BARKER, LIFE OF AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 385.
211. Id. at 384.
212. Id.
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their various relations with each other through the medium of the
tribunals of justice–your codes designed for the particular use of
Louisiana but embracing [general], principles applicable to all civi-
lized communities you seem to have given to the people of all coun-
tries a species of tacit claim upon the richly stored resources of your
mind in relation to the political organization of society and the gen-
eral principles of jurisprudence.213
Austin’s decision to praise Livingston’s judicial tribunals, codes, and
principles of jurisprudence at the beginning of the letter, during a time of
great personal anxiety and heavy public duty, suggests that Austin
thought Livingston’s laws and ideas of jurisprudence were very impor-
tant. This suggestion is supported by the fact that the word “codes” is one
of the only words that Austin underlined in the letter.214
Austin specifically states that principles of Louisiana laws are applica-
ble to other places, and he claims that people outside Louisiana use Liv-
ingston’s principles of jurisprudence. Austin gives no indication that he is
talking about other people only; his obsequiousness suggests that he is
one of the people who have been the beneficiary of Livingston’s law
codes and ideas about jurisprudence. In his letter, Austin proposed gen-
eral outlines of a new land and debt law for Texas. After describing his
proposal, he writes:
This system would probably greatly reduce the number of lawsuits
about 99/100 which would of course greatly diminish the number of
lawyers—this would be an important point gained—I wish you to
understand that I have no prejudices against lawyers merely because
they belong to that profession. My objections are to the system of
laws that renders such a swarm of agents necessary to administer
them [& I wish to remedy].215
In Austin’s draft, he did not include the phrase, “& I wish to remedy.”
Instead, he wrote a description of his philosophy of lawmaking:
justice ought to be prompt plain simple and not expensive—to be so
the laws must be plain, as few as possible, and accessible to the un-
derstanding of everyone—not loaded down by a labarinth of forms,
nor by the precedents and decisions of centuries past, which no one
but a very well read lawyer can comprehend.216
Austin crossed this passage out, and it is not included in the finished
213. Stephen F. Austin to Edward Livingston, June 24, 1832, The Edward Livingston
Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University.
214. Id. It is not underlined in the draft that Austin kept in his papers. Stephen F.
Austin to Unknown, June 24, 1832, Stephen F. Austin Papers, Briscoe Center for American
History, University of Texas at Austin. This suggests that Austin wanted to make sure Liv-
ingston knew that his codes were important to Austin.
215. Stephen F. Austin to Edward Livingston, June 24, 1832, The Edward Livingston
Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University.
216. Stephen F. Austin to Unknown, June 24, 1832, Stephen F. Austin Papers, Dolph
Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin.
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letter that survives Livingston’s papers.217 Nevertheless, it is a nearly per-
fect description of Edward Livingston’s philosophy of lawmaking, and it
points to the sources of Livingston’s 1805 law.
4. Livingston’s Law Was English, but It Was Inspired by Spanish and
Arab Institutions
Livingston drew from the “richly stored resources” of his mind to cre-
ate a new law with several ancestors. The most important of these was
English equity, but the simplicity of Spanish procedure and the philoso-
phy of Jeremy Bentham were important, too.
a. Livingston’s Law Uses the Words of English Equity
Livingston’s inclusion of the phrase “free from unnecessary prolixity,
and from any matter scandalous, libellous, or impertinent” is probably
the most conspicuous way that his 1805 law differs from Austin’s 1824
law. And the phrase reveals the most important legal source for Living-
ston’s law. A 1661 Order of the High Court of Chancery in England—one
of the courts that developed English equity practice—provided that
counsel shall take care that deeds, writings, or records, be not unnec-
essarily set out therein in haec verba; but that so much of them only
as is pertinent and material be set out or stated, or the effect and
substance of so much of them only as is pertinent and material be set
out or stated, or the effect and substance of so much of them only as
is pertinent and material be given, as counsel may deem advisable,
without needless prolixity; and that no scandalous matter be inserted
therein.218
Standard treatises on pleading in equity proceedings during Living-
ston’s time were full of warnings against petitions containing prolixity,
impertinence, and scandal.219 For example, one of the books in Living-
ston’s library was Coopers Equity Pleadings.220 It explains that an attor-
ney signing a pleading in equity practice must “guard against bills
containing scandal and impertinence, or irrelevant matter, which the
records of the court might otherwise be made vehicles of.”221
217. Stephen F. Austin to Edward Livingston, June 24, 1832, Edward Livingston Pa-
pers, Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey.
218. Order VIII, Pleadings and Written Proceedings Generally, No. 2, May 22, 1661, in
THE CONSOLIDATED GENERAL ORDERS OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 296 (V. R.
Stevens and G. S. Norton, Oxford 1860).
219. See, e.g., GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 19 (1809); RALPH BARNES, INQUIRY INTO EQUITY PRAC-
TICE 47 (1827) (noting that “forms of Pleadings are, by the orders of the Court, to be short
and succinct, but in practice they are open to the charge of unnecessary prolixity”); MAT-
THEW BACON, 4 A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 90 (1796) (instructing practitioners at
law to avoid prolixity in pleading). See also Mitchell Franklin, Libraries of Edward Living-
ston and of Moreau Lislet, 15 TUL. L. REV. 401, 414 (1940–1941) (listing “Coopers Equity
Pleadings” and “Bacons Abridgement” in Livingston’s Library, but not listing the year or
edition of either work).
220. Franklin, supra note 219, at 414.
221. COOPER, supra note 219, at 19.
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The prohibition against unnecessary matter in chancery pleadings was
not just common, it was also very old and famous. Cooper notes that
“[p]rolixity appears to have been anciently a fault in a bill” that is too
long, and “[t]he letter of this rule of pleading has been long done away,
but the principle of it still remains in the existing rules of the court as to
scandal and impertinence.”222 A contemporary of Cooper’s noted that a
“striking instance of the vigour with which [the Lord Chancellor] strove
to correct the prolixity of the written pleadings in his Court” is the 1597
case of Mylward v. Weldon.223 In that case, the Lord Chancellor observed
that a scrivener named Richard Mylward had filed a replication—a plead-
ing in equity practice—“of six score sheets, all the matter thereof which
pertinent might have been well contrived in sixteen [sheets of paper].”224
The Chancellor ruled that
such an abuse is not in any sort to be tolerated— proceeding of a
malicious purpose to increase the defendant’s charge, and being
fraught with much impertinent matter not fit for this Court, it is
therefore ordered, that the Warden of the Fleet shall take the said
Richard Mylward into his custody, and shall bring him into Westmin-
ster Hall on Saturday about 10 of the clock in the forenoon, and then
and there shall cut a hole in the myddest of the same engrossed Rep-
lication, which is delivered unto him for that purpose, and put the
said Richard’s head through the same hole, and so let the same Rep-
lication hang about his shoulders with the written side outward, and
then, the same so hanging, shall lead the same Richard, bareheaded
and barefaced, round about Westminster Hall whilst the Courts are
sitting, and shall show him at the bar of every of the three Courts
with the Hall.225
At the time, this punishment was sensational; a merciless, humiliating
spectacle redolent of star chamber.226 It was so shocking, in fact, that
Shakespeare wrote a joke about it. A few months after the Lord Chancel-
lor ruled in Mylward, while the punishment was still news in England,
Shakespeare published Henry IV. In one of the play’s most famous
scenes,227 Sir John Falstaff, who is a farcical character, conspires with five
of his friends to rob several travelers at an inn. Two of the conspirators,
Prince Hal and Poins, leave the scene while Falstaff and the others rob
222. Id. at 19–20.
223. JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF
THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 180 (1851).
224. Id. at 180– 81 (1851) (citing Mylward v. Weldon, Reg. Lib. A. 1596, f. 267). Camp-
bell thought the ruling on this case was issued in 1596, but this is a mistake based on a
misunderstanding of the “Old Style” calendar; the correct date of the decision was Febru-
ary 10, 1597. CHARLES PHELPS, FALSTAFF AND EQUITY 138 (1901). Phelps was a law pro-
fessor and judge who wrote, among other things, a treatise on chancery practice called
“Juridical Equity.” Ibid. Title Page.
225. CAMPBELL, supra note 223, at 180–81. Campbell noted that this “order should
have gone on to require that a print of the unlucky Richard, with his head peeping through
the volumes of sheep skin, should, in terrorem, be hung-up in the chambers of every equity
draftsman.”
226. PHELPS, supra note 224, at 78.
227. Id. at 2.
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the travelers. Hal (who is the Prince of Wales, heir to the throne of En-
gland) and Poins then decide to don masks and rob Falstaff of the loot in
disguise, just to be able to joke about it later. They hide as Falstaff divides
the stolen goods, and watch as he tells the remaining conspirators:
Come, my masters, let us share, and then to horse before day. An the
Prince and Poins be not two arrant cowards, there’s no equity stir-
ring: there’s no more valour in that Poins than in a wild-duck.228
Here, Falstaff ostensibly uses the term “equity stirring” in earnest: if
there’s any justice in the world, Prince Hal and Poins are cowards. But
Shakespeare’s audience would know that an earnest remark would be out
of character for Falstaff, and that the heir to the throne was about to rob
the man who was calling him a coward. Indeed, Shakespeare uses the
term as an ironic aside to the audience. He plays on their knowledge of
the notorious punishment that a court of equity had just imposed on a
scrivener for filing pleadings that were unnecessarily prolix, part of a
wider conflict between the courts of law and the rising court of equity
which was grabbing headlines and power.229 Shakespeare is saying that
equity is stirring, with the prince and Falstaff, and with the Lord Chancel-
lor and English law. So when Livingston mentions prolixity, scandal, and
impertinence, he is using the language of a very long line of English
thought, one that influenced the most important institutions of English-
speaking law and culture: he is using the language of English equity.
Equity was also the source of the form of the summons in Livingston’s
1805 pleading law. The form for a summons in equity reproduced below
was promulgated by Acts of Parliament after Livingston’s death, but it
embodies orders of the High Court of Chancery during Livingston’s life-
time. The Chancery orders, in turn, were only very slight variations on
writs of subpoena, which were developed in early medieval England, and
were predecessors of writs of summons in equity.230 Both forms use much
the same language as Livingston’s —and Austin’s—form of summons.
228. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 1 HENRY IV. ACT II SCENE 2. Livingston likely had a
copy of this play. Franklin, supra note 219, at 409 (listing an eight volume set of “Shakes-
pear” in Livingston’s library).
229. PHELPS, supra note 224, at xiv, 75–78. See also THE SHAKESPEARE SOCIETY OF
NEW YORK, 10 SHAKESPEARIANA 189 (1893) (noting that “in the spring of the same mem-
orable year, 1597, while ‘equity was stirring’ and shaking Westminster Hall with Homeric
or rather Elizabethan laughter in the person of the unlucky scrivener with his bare head
protruding through the hole cut by the chancellor’s order in his too voluminous replication
in the chancery case of Mylward vs. Weldon,” Shakespeare himself was mired in a large
chancery case in 1597 called Shakespeare v. Lambert).
230. EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, 1 A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF CHANCERY 558–59 (1837).
80 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
Summons in EquityWrit of Subpoena
In the High Court of Justice, ChanceryTo X. Y. greeting. We command you, that
Division, Between A. B., Plaintiff, andwithin ___days after service of this writ on
C.D., Defendant. To C. D., of ___, in theyou, exclusive of the day of such service;
county of ___.laying all other matters and excuses aside,
We command you, that within ___ daysyou do cause an appearance to be entered
after the service of this writ on you, inclu-for you, in our high Court of Chancery, to
sive of the day of such service, you doa Bill filed against you by A. B., and that
cause an appearance to be entered for youyou do answer concerning such things as
in an action at the suit of A. B.; and takeshall be then and there alleged against
notice that in default of your so doing theyou; and observe what our said Court shall
plaintiff may proceed therein, and judg-direct in this behalf, upon pain of an
ment may be given in your absence. Wit-attachment issuing against your person;
ness, ___, Lord High Chancellor of Greatsuch other process for contempt as the
Britain, the ___ day of ___, in the year ofCourt shall award. Witness ourself at
our Lord, One Thousand nine hundredWestminster, the ___ day of ___ in the ___
and ___.”232year of our reign.231
Even the terms “petition and answer” Livingston’s law indicate that it
came from equity,233 as this description of the basic elements of equity
pleading shows:
A suit in equity is commenced by bill, which is a petition setting forth
the subject of complaint, with such allegations as tend to corroborate
the statement, or to anticipate and controvert the claims of the ad-
verse party, closing with a prayer for the appropriate relief, and for
process against the defendant to compel him to appear and an-
swer. . . . By the answer the defendant either controverts the case
stated by the plaintiff, or denies some parts of it, or admits the case
as stated by the plaintiff, and submits to the judgment of the court
upon it, or relies upon new matter stated in the answer. . . . If the
defense is by answer, it must be sworn to. If the answer admits the
allegations made by the plaintiff in the bill, the cause is set down to
be heard on bill and answer.234
b. Livingston’s Law Intentionally Connected Equity with Spanish
Law
The terms “petition and answer” are not just from equity; they are also
English translations of Spanish and ancient Roman terms for pleadings.
231. Order of Lord Brougham, December 21, 1833, in REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED
AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY DURING THE TIME OF LORD CHAN-
CELLOR BROUGHAM AND SIR JOHN LEACH, MASTER OF THE ROLLS XXI (London 1834).
232. Order of the High Court of Chancery II, Rule 3. Form 1 (1875), in WILLIAM
DOWNES GRIFFITH, THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS, 1873, 1875, & 1877, at
479 (London 1877). A similar form of summons had been promulgated by an Act of Parlia-
ment in 1832 for cases at law. 2 Will. IV. Cap. 39. The Act noted its purpose was to remedy
the “great variety and multiplicity” of “the process for the commencement of personal
actions in his Majesty’s superior Courts of Law at Westminster” which was “very inconve-
nient in practice.” Id. This suggests that the form embodies other forms that had already
been in use.
233. Robert Wyness Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REV. 596, 604
(1937) (arguing that Livingston’s law “provided for the conduct of the suit by petition and
answer, on principles largely drawn from the system of chancery pleading”).
234. SAYLES, supra note 136, at 387, 389.
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Thus, even when Livingston’s law uses the language of English equity, it
is suggesting the influence of the civil law, and it does this for a very good
reason.
The law of Louisiana was predominantly Spanish from 1769 to 1803.
During those years, the Louisiana judicial system was administered under
the same rules as other Spanish colonies,235 with alcaldes presiding over
its trial courts.236 Prior to the Louisiana Purchase, its law was based
mostly on sections of the Recopilacion and Partidas, with the Custom of
Paris and the 1667 Ordonnance Civil of France mixed in.237 When Living-
ston’s 1805 pleading law replaced the Spanish pleading system that had
been in use in Louisiana,238 it was part of a broader replacement of the
old Spanish and French law with new laws from English-speaking immi-
grants, but the civil law was still very popular: in 1808, Louisiana enacted
a Civil Code, about 95% of which was from civil law jurisdictions of con-
tinental Europe.239
Livingston himself was an admirer of the civil law and eventually be-
came the most important civil law theorist for the Louisiana French.240
Soon after he arrived in Louisiana, some American lawyers filed a suit
seeking a judicial declaration that the common law was in force in Louisi-
ana.241 Livingston led a group of civil law attorneys who argued that the
law in Louisiana was based on Roman law, not English, and that the laws
of Spain that had been in effect at the time of the Louisiana Purchase
were still in force.242 Livingston won, to the great relief of the people of
the territory.243 The American governor of , however, wanted its laws to
be Americanized, with more common law and less civil law.244
Responding to the judicial victory and popularity of the civil law on the
one hand, and pressure to introduce American law on the other, the terri-
torial legislature called on Livingston in early 1805 to draft a new civil
and criminal law code for the Territory.245 It would have to incorporate
“British Statute and Common Laws, and the codes of all the States” into
235. See Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1487–88 (citing Baade, French and Spanish Louisi-
ana, supra note 36, at 3).
236. EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE 92 n.35 (1920).
237. Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1487–88.
238. Henry P. Dart, The Place of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 4 TUL. L. REV. 163, 169
(1930).
239. Batiza, supra note 91, at 11–12. Around 87% was French, and 8% was Spanish. Id.
240. Mitchell Franklin, The Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish Me-
dieval law from Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 319, 321 (1942).
241. Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1804–1812,
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 1, 38–39 (1957).
242. Id. at 39–40.
243. Hunt, supra note 201, at 116.
244. BROWN, supra note 241, at 37 (citing a letter from William C.C. Claiborne, Gover-
nor of the Orleans Territory, to James Madison, U.S. Secretary of State, October 29, 1804).
245. John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, Part II, The Code of Practice, 7
TUL. L. REV. 82, 83 (1934) (citing Acts passed at the first session of the Legislative Council
of the Territory of Orleans in 1805).
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the codes while maintaining the bulk of Louisiana’s civil law system.246
The American Governor of the Orleans Territory worried that the codes
would introduce more common law provisions into the laws of the terri-
tory than its people would be willing to tolerate.247 Accordingly, Living-
ston’s task was to compose codes that brought Louisiana law closer to
that of the rest of the United States, but without appearing to stray too
far from the civil law.
The finished product was a success. The civil code’s procedural provi-
sions remained in effect for the next 25 years, and later Louisiana laws
substantially retained them.248 One of the reasons they endured was their
seamless mix of civil law and American legal traditions. The ways in
which Livingston’s pleading provision did this were ingenious.
Notice his use of the word “libellous” in the 1805 Orleans Territory
pleading law. None of the Spanish, equity, or common law rules of plead-
ing specifically prohibit libelous matter in pleadings. Instead, those
sources use an identically-sounding noun, libellus, which is Latin for “lit-
tle book,” to refer to a petition. Libellus was considered by some equity
practitioners to be the root word for the English “bill,” which is a petition
in equity pleading.249 In Latin and Spanish practice, libellus does not
mean “libelous,” nor does the English term “libelous” describe pleading.
Livingston’s use of the word “libellous” to describe a petition is, there-
fore, a pun. It tries to create irony by tying three different things to-
gether—English equity, libel law, and Roman law—through the use of a
single word. To understand more clearly what Livingston was trying to do
and why he was trying to do it, consider a similar joke in a book that
Livingston owned, a comedic poem called the Pleader’s Guide.250
The poem features a series of characters explaining differences in
pleading under common law, equity law, admiralty law, canon law, and
Roman (or civil) law systems.251 One of the characters tries to make fun
of the pleading system of civil law jurisdictions like Spain:
Since Edward from his subjects broke
The bondage of the Roman yoke
Are but a vain and empty shade
Without the sanction and the aid,
The forms, the process, and the mode
Coercive of the British Code.
How vain’s the Civil Law’s Citation,
The Libel, Oath, and Fulmination.252
246. BROWN, supra note 241, at 40 (citing letter from James Brown to John Bracken-
ridge, January 22, 1805).
247. Id. at 38–39.
248. Id. at 44.
249. ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY IN THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 109–110 (1890).
250. Franklin, supra note 219, at 409.
251. THE PLEADER’S GUIDE, A DIDACTIC POEM 24 (1796).
252. Id. at 29.
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In that passage, “Edward” is King Edward I, who began to replace
Roman law with what developed over many centuries into various
branches of English law. “Citation,” the editor of the Pleader’s Guide
explains, is “a summons to appear before an ecclesiastical judge.”253 And
“Libel” is “Libellus, in the Ecclesiastical Courts,” which the editor illus-
trates with the verses that are found in many English treatises on equity
pleading and in Spanish legal sources like Febrero:254
Quis, quid, coram quo, quo jure petatur, et a quo,
Recte compositus quisque Libellus habet.255
In this way, the Pleader’s Guide connects the English word “libel” to
the Roman (and Spanish) libellus. And the way it connects them is a joke
because, right after the character says that English law conquered Roman
law, the author of the poem demonstrates that the Roman law survives in
the language and practices of English law. Livingston’s use of the word
“libellous” performs the same task. It is a pun demonstrating that his
pleading system uses the language of English equity, but is ultimately de-
rived from Roman—and Spanish—practice. Joseph Story’s Equity Plead-
ings, one of the books in Livingston’s library, makes exactly that point.256
The pleadings in Equity were probably borrowed from the Civil Law,
or from the Canon Law (which is a derivative from the Civil Law), or
from both. The early Chancellors were for the most part, if not alto-
gether, Ecclesiastics, and many of them were bred up in the jurispru-
dence of Civil and Canon Law; and it was natural for them, in the
administration of their judicial function in the Court of Chancery, to
transfer into that Court the modes of proceeding, with which they
were most familiar. Hence, at almost every step, we may now trace
coincidences between the pleadings and practice in Chancery, and
the pleadings and practice in a Roman suit and in an Ecclesiastical
suit.257
Therefore, Livingston’s use of the word “libellous” connects his plead-
ing system with the civil law system of Spain, which had been in effect in
Louisiana until the enactment of his 1805 law. In fact, it almost certainly
253. Id. at 26.
254. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
255. THE PLEADER’S GUIDE, supra note <CITE _Ref494568512“>, at 30. Roughly
translated, this means that any petition correctly written must state with certainty to what
court application is made, who complains, of whom he complains, what wrong he did, and
the amount of damage done. For centuries, commentators on English equity have ex-
plained that these Latin verses form the “common distich,” as the matter of a Bill, and that
it “is applicable to all pleadings.” It answers to the declaration at common law, to the libel
or libellus articulatus, of the civil and common law. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARY ON EQ-
UITY PLEADINGS 21 (1844). It equally applies to pleadings under the codes, and to plead-
ings of a defendant where he files a cross complaint, or statement for affirmative relief.”
WILLIAM HUGHES, 2 PROCEDURE, ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE 1105 (1905). The distich is
also in Febrero Adicionado, see supra, note 116, Livingston had seven volumes of Febrero
in his library. Franklin, supra note 219, at 413.
256. Franklin, supra note 219, at 414 (listing “Storys Pleadings”).
257. STORY, supra note 73, at 11–12. This work is cited in almost all the annotations on
English and American rules of chancery practice.
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accounts for the reason that Law 40 of the Partidas appears to be a cousin
of the 1836 Texas pleading law: Livingston’s punning allusion to the libel-
lus of Spanish pleading law signaled his keen awareness of, and interest
in, the Spanish pleading law of the Partidas. In this way, Austin’s reliance
on Livingston’s law, and the 1836 Texas pleading law’s reliance on Aus-
tin’s law, transmitted a shadow of Spanish law to independent Texas.
The pun also associates his law with the law of the Church of Rome,
which used the petition and libellus, and was part of the foundation of the
civil law.258 Livingston’s law did eliminate the procedure of the Spanish
pleading system,259 but it also intentionally rejected the common law sys-
tem,260 and its allusion to Spanish practice reminds the reader that the
procedure it introduced, English equity, was thoroughly Roman—more
civil law than common law—and therefore related to Spanish practice.
The connection between English equity and civil law pleading was not
only lexical, it was also substantive. For example, the prohibition against
prolixity was a common feature of the civil law in continental Europe,
and had been since ancient times. One of the most important law codes in
European history, and the foundation for much of the Partidas and En-
glish equity, was the Code of Justinian, written in the 6th century. Much
of the introduction to Justinian’s Code criticized the wordiness of existing
law, and called for simplification and concision in the new law. This was
so important and well known in medieval Europe that Dante wrote about
it in the Divine Comedy:
Cesare fui, e son Giustiniano,
Che, per voler del primo Amor, ch’io sento
D’entro alle leggi trassi il troppo e ‘l vano261
Which has been translated as:
Caesar I was, and now Justinian stand,
And primal love so urged me that to clear
The laws of bale and bulk I gave command262
Dante is alluding to several passages in Justinian’s Code prohibiting
unnecessary prolixity. Among them is omne jus antiquum supervacua
prolixitate liberum atque enucleatum,263 which means that new law must
be free from the unnecessary prolixity—supervacua prolixitate—of the
old law. Justinian was explaining that he included former laws into his
Digest and Institutes, but “only after its prolixity and lack of clarity had
258. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 130 (1995).
259. Rabalais, supra note 89, at 1491. (citing DART, supra note 238, at 169).
260. Edward Livingston to Jeremy Bentham, July 1, 1830, in 11 JOHN BOWRING,
WORKS OF BENTHAM, 52 (Edinburgh 1838). Bentham wrote that his 1805 pleading law was
the “rejection of the common law procedure in civil suits.” Id.
261. DANTE ALIGHIERI, LA DIVINA COMEDIA, CANTO VI, ARGOMENTO, LL. 10–12
(Venezia 1760).
262. JAMES WILLIAMS, DANTE AS A JURIST 13 (1906).
263. Id. at 13 n.2 (1906) (citing in De Emendatione Codicis Justinianie, section 1).
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been eradicated.”264 Livingston would have known this: he had four dif-
ferent editions of Justinian’s works in his library.265 In fact, Livingston
was described in Louisiana’s chief newspaper of the time as an “Ameri-
can Justinian” for his mastery of Roman law.266
The English equity prohibition against prolixity was an ancient and fa-
mous feature of Roman law and continental European culture. Living-
ston’s use of the phrase “unnecessary prolixity” in his 1805 pleading law
was a way to use the language of equity to enact the principles of the
European legal tradition to which Spanish law belonged. Indeed, Living-
ston’s mentor, Jeremy Bentham, thought Spanish practice and equity
were branches of the same family tree. Bentham wrote that “the trunk (I
speak of Rome-bred procedure) such is it in four at least of its branches:
Continental law in general; English equity law; English Spiritual law; En-
glish (coinciding with Continental) Admiralty law.”267
c. Livingston Was Inspired by Jeremy Bentham
Bentham was an English philosopher and a famous advocate of codifi-
cation. In fact, he coined the term “codification.”268 He was also a law
reformer who took a particular interest in simplifying civil procedure.269
Bentham detested technical procedure rules, and wanted to prohibit dis-
missal of cases on procedural technicalities.270
Livingston was one of Bentham’s earliest and most devoted follow-
ers.271 They were also friends and frequent correspondents. In 1830, Liv-
ingston wrote to Bentham to let him know “how much my work is
indebted to yours for those parts of my attempts to reform the laws of my
state, which have found favour from the public.”272 In that letter, Living-
ston discussed just two of the many laws that Bentham had influenced:
one is the Louisiana Civil Code of 1823, and the other is 1805 Louisiana
Practice Act. Livingston wrote that the 1805 law was more important, and
explained why:
A simple system was substituted, based upon the plan of requiring
each party to state, in intelligible language, the cause of complaint,
and the grounds of defence. I comprised it in a single law of a few
264. HALCYON WEBER, A HYPOTHESIS REGARDING JUSTINIAN’S Decisions and the Di-
gest, ROMAN LEGAL TRADITION 42, 113–14 (Ames Foundation, Harvard Law School,
2015).
265. Franklin, supra note 219, at 408–14.
266. Franklin, supra note 240, at 325 n.12.
267. JEREMY BENTHAM, SCOTCH REFORM, CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
PLAN, PROPOSED IN THE LATE PARLIAMENT, FOR THE REGULATION OF THE COURTS, AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN SCOTLAND 80 (1808).
268. Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 569, 594 (1976).
269. Dean Alfange, Jr., Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 58, 61 (1969).
270. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 346 (1986).
271. Charles Noble Gregory, Bentham and the Codifiers, 13 HARVARD L. REV. 5, 344,
353 (1900).
272. Edward Livingston to Jeremy Bentham, July 1, 1830, in 11 JOHN BOWRING,
WORKS OF BENTHAM 51 (Edinburgh 1838).
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pages; and although, from its novelty, many questions may be natu-
rally supposed to arise under it, before the court and suitors become
accustomed to its provisions; yet our books of Reports, from 1808 to
1823, contain fewer cases depending on disputed points of practice,
than occurred in a single year, 1803, in New York, where they pro-
ceed according to the English law, which has been in a train of settle-
ments by adjudication so many hundred years.273
Livingston told Bentham in the same letter that he could teach new
lawyers the civil procedure under the 1805 law in about a day.274
That would have pleased Bentham, who detested complicated proce-
dure in general, and common law pleading in particular,275 so much so
that he proposed abolishing written pleadings altogether, and mocked
lawyers who disagreed. “What? Put an end to Written Pleadings?” he
asked rhetorically. “Rob us of our business? Knock up our profession?
Substitute Turkish to Scotch and English justice? Whence comes this
man?”276
Bentham’s reference to “Turkish . . . justice” is an important clue to the
source of his ideas about pleading. He thought that the ideal form of gov-
ernment was embodied in family life, which he called domestic govern-
ment. Bentham admired its simplicity and efficiency, its emphasis on
substantive decisions, and the absence of procedure. The judge, not
outside rules or those being judged, controls domestic adjudication. And
Bentham thought that the nearest that any political and judicial arrange-
ment comes to the domestic system is that of the Turkish cade. Bentham
wrote that the “whole train of Adjective law”—meaning procedural
law—”is dispensed with in Despotic Government, which comes nearest in
its simplicity to the domestic. The Cade without form or precept takes
cognizance of a complaint, and without delay of pleading or the interven-
tion of official functions, issues his definitive command upon the spot.”277
The Turkish cade or cadi is the Arab al-qadi, a judicial office that be-
came the Spanish alcalde.278 The political and judicial leaders of towns in
Leu¨n, Castile, and Portugal were called a iudex in Roman times, then a
juez in early medieval times, who was assisted in the administration of
justice by an al-qadi, or alcalde.279 The al-qadi sat by himself in his home
or in a court house, with a secretary taking only oral testimony.280 Under
the terms of a typical commission, a qadi was to ask questions of the
litigants, listen to witness testimony, and issue a judgment without
273. Id. at 52.
274. Id.
275. Bentham proposed to destroy 90% of English common law pleading, and improve
on the remaining 10%. Bentham, supra note 267, at 60.
276. Id. at 57.
277. POSTEMA, supra note 270, at 350 n.18 (quoting a Bentham manuscript in Univer-
sity College, London Library Box 99, page 119).
278. Karen B. Graubart, Learning from the Qadi, 95 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 2, 204 n.32
(2015). The alguacil, or justice, came from the Arab wazir, or adviser, minister.
279. JOSEPH F. O’CALLAGHAN, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL SPAIN 270 (1983).
280. ALBERT HABIB HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 114 (2002).
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delay.281
Bentham’s praise of this figure was intentionally provocative. In En-
gland, the idea of the cadi represented everything that was arbitrary and
dangerous in foreign thinking.282 But Bentham thought formalism and
technicality were also very dangerous because they delayed justice at
best, and thwarted justice at worst. Procedural rules were enemies of jus-
tice, Bentham reasoned, because they allow the party who follows proce-
dural technicalities to win at trial even if he disobeyed substantive law
before trial, and they allow the party who misses a procedural technicality
at trial to lose, even if he obeyed substantive law before trial.283 And
Bentham thought the rich had no advantage before the cadi, because they
could not purchase the services of a lawyer who might outmaneuver a
poor adversary in procedure. For that reason, the cadi, who had no use
for formal procedural rules, was more likely to dispense justice than
judges who were bound by pointless technicalities.
By those who have nothing to give, a Cadi will not be bribed: those
whom he knows nothing of he will have no motive to favour or to
oppress. To those from his treatment of whom supposing it to be just,
he has nothing to fear, nor supposing it to be unjust, to hope, he will
have no motive to treat with more favour than is due to them, or
with less. In this predicament lies the bulk of the poor: that is of the
great body of the people. A Cadi then as far as his intelligence ex-
tends will generally do justice to the great body of the people. He
will give the redress which is their due to those who come before him
in the capacity of plaintiffs: he will give the protection that is their
due to those who are brought before him in the capacity of
defendants.284
For Bentham, praising the cadi was not only a way to argue in favor of
simplified judicial procedure; it was also a way to attack both the com-
mon law, which Bentham thought was pointlessly intricate,285 and the En-
glish judge and legal theorist William Blackstone, whom Bentham
famously loathed.286 Several decades before Bentham praised the cadi,
Blackstone criticized Turkish judicial procedure:
In Turkey, says Montesquieu, where little regard is shewn to the lives
or fortunes of the subject, all causes are quickly decided: the basha,
on a summary hearing, orders which party he pleases to be bastina-
doed, and then send them about their business. But in free states the
281. O’CALLAGHAN, supra note 279, at 114 (citing Historia de los jueces de Cu¨rdoba,
7–8).
282. POSTEMA, supra note 270, at 350–51.
283. Id. at 351 n. 19 (quoting a manuscript in University College, London Library, Box
99, page 178).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 147.
286. See Posner, supra note 268 at 569–70 (calling Bentham “Blackstone’s severest
critic,” who “damned” Blackstone “with uncommon violence”). See also ALFANGE, supra
note 269, at 66 (1969) (noting that Bentham’s “chief adversary in the area of the common
law” was, among many other, lesser, adversaries, “Blackstone”).
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trouble, expense, and delays of judicial proceedings are the price that
every subject pays for his liberty . . . the formalities of law increase,
in proportion to the value which is set on the honour, the fortune,
the liberty, and the life of the subject.287
In this way, the cadi, or al-qadi—the future alcalde of Spain, Mexico,
Louisiana, and Texas —was doubly important to Bentham. The practices
of the office represented a provocative rejection of common law proce-
dure, which he spent much of his life criticizing, and it was the best exam-
ple of the kind of simple, quick, summary justice that he spent much of
his life trying to enact.
And when Livingston said that he was indebted to Bentham for a sim-
ple pleading law of a few pages, a law that reduced litigation and could be
learned in a day, he was crediting a philosophy of judicial procedure that
rejected common law procedure, and that was founded on the practices
of the office that would become the alcalde in Texas.
C. TEXAS PLEADING RESEMBLES OTHER LOUISIANA TERRITORY
LAWS
Just before Austin sent his approved pleading law to the alcaldes in
May of 1824, he wrote his mother and sister asking for a copy of a book
called Geyer’s Digest.288 Austin was a delegate to the Territorial Legisla-
ture of Missouri in 1818, and one of his colleagues was Henry Geyer, who
published a Digest of the Laws of Missouri that year.289 Geyer’s Digest
contains two pleading provisions: one for suits at law, the other for eq-
uity. The provision pleading in chancery proceedings looks like a cross
between Austin’s law and the 1836 Texas pleading law. Compare all
three:
287. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
328 (Birch and Small, Philadelphia 1803). Bentham also disliked Montesquieu, who praised
the “technical system” of British judicial procedure. R. HARRISON, THE PEOPLE IS MY
CAESAR, 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 926 (1993).
288. Stephen F. Austin to His Mother and Sister, May 4, 1824, Austin Papers, Dolph
Briscoe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin. He wrote, “Pray
do not forget to bring Me a Copy of the Laws of Missouri, Gyers digest, or if there is a later
one bring it, also the Constitutions of Missouri and Illinois do not forget this. . . .”
289. McKnight, Austin’s Legalistic Concerns, supra note 160, at 248 n.40.
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Austin’s Civil Regulations 1836 Texas Pleading LawGeyer’s 1818 Digest
Any person having cause of It shall be the duty of the[T]he complainant may, on
complaint against another, plaintiff or his attorney, infiling a bill or petition with
within the jurisdiction of an taking out a writ or process,the clerk of the general
alcalde must present a writ- to file his petition, with a(superior) court, stating the
ten petition to the alcalde of full and clear statement ofnature of his complaint,
the proper district, stating in the names of the parties,obtain from said clerk, a
a short but clear manner the whether plaintiff or defen-summons which shall be
cause and nature of his dant, with the causes ofserved and returned by the
complaint, to which the action, and the nature ofsheriff as in ordinary cases.
[alcalde] will attatch a sum- relief, which he requests ofIt shall be the duty of every
mons in the form follow- the court.292person who obtains a sum-
ing— “Austin’s Colony, 1836 Consultation Summonsmons as aforesaid, to deliver
District of ___ the constable Formto the sheriff a copy of his
of said district is com- To E. P. Sheriff of thebill or petition filed as
manded to summons the municipality of ___:aforesaid, which copy the
above-named C. D., if to be We command you, that yousheriff shall deliver to the
found in the above district, summons, or attach, thedefendant.290
to appear before me A. B., body of A. B., so that he be
alcalde of said district, at my and appear before ___, first
office (or wherever the suit Judge of the municipality of
is to be tried), between the ___, on the ___ day of __, in
hours of nine o’clock A.M. the year ___, at the town of
and three o’clock P.M., on ___, to answer to C. D. in a
the ___ day of ___, to plea of ___ to his damage
answer the above complaint and as you faithfully execute
of E.F and on or before that this, so you will answer.
day this summons and the Witness E. F. our said Judge
proceedings thereon must be of the aforesaid municipal-
returned to my office— ity, on the __ day of ___ A.
Given this ___ day of ____. D., __ at the town of __. G.
A.B. alcalde.291 H., Clerk. Issued on ___
A.D.293
The Missouri Territory was the northern part of the old Louisiana
Purchase; the Orleans Territory—the territory Livingston wrote his law
for—was the southern part. The Missouri Territory was known as the
Louisiana Territory from 1805 until 1812.294 The pleading law in Geyer’s
Missouri Digest was a law of the Louisiana Territory that had been
passed in 1810, and had gone into effect in 1811.295 Before 1810, the Loui-
siana Territory appears to have had no pleading law of its own.296 Instead,
290. Chancery Proceedings, §§ 1, 2, in HENRY GEYER, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MIS-
SOURI 105–06 (1818).
291. Art. 3 in Austin’s Alcalde Code, supra note 143, at 76.
292. Act approved Dec. 22, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., §8, 1836–37 Repub. Tex. Laws 198,
201, in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1258, 1261.
293. Ordinances and Decrees of the General Council of the Provisional Government of
Texas, An Ordinance and Decree for opening the several Courts of Justice, appointing
Clerks, Prosecuting Attorneys, and defining their duties, &c., Section 1, January 16, 1836,
in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1044.
294. William Wirt Howe, Law in the Louisiana Purchase, 14 YALE L. J. 77, 79 (1904).
295. Laws of Louisiana Territory, An Act Regulating the mode of Judicial proceedings
in certain cases, and extending certain powers to the General Court, Sections 1 and 2,
Passed 26 October 1810, In force 1 January 1811.
296. The Louisiana Territory was known as the District of Louisiana from 1804 to 1805
and, during that time, it was administered by the Territory of Indiana. The pleading law of
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legislation creating each iteration of the territory continued all laws in
force at the time of each act,297 and the only pleading law that was in
force in a jurisdiction of the former Louisiana Purchase was Livingston’s
1805 law. Like the Orleans Territory, the Missouri Territory was largely
French-speaking, but had been governed by Spanish law before it was
acquired by the United States.298 Based on this evidence, it stands to rea-
son that 1810 Louisiana Territory pleading law—the law in Geyer’s Di-
gest—used Livingston’s Orleans Territory law as a source.
Similarities in language between the two laws support that conclusion.
The Missouri pleading law was designed for chancery practice and, like
Livingston’s law, uses the words of English equity. It looks quite a lot like
the 1836 Texas pleading law299 and, if the Missouri, i.e., Louisiana Terri-
tory, law was a source of the Texas pleading law, it would be additional
evidence that the 1836 Texas pleading law is directly descended from En-
glish equity through the early pleading laws of the former Louisiana
Purchase and Stephen F. Austin’s rules for his colony’s alcaldes.
V. SOURCES OF THE CURRENT TEXAS PLEADING SYSTEM
Texas amended the 1836 pleading law in 1846 with very few changes,
none of them substantive.300 The resulting law was so simple that, by
1877, Chief Justice Oran Roberts concluded that new rules were “neces-
sary to establish some system of . . . practice in the courts” because it
“was generally understood, and acted on, that there was no such thing as
the Indiana Territory was a purely common-law provision, and it was passed in 1807, two
years after the District of Louisiana became the Territory of Louisiana and was no longer
administered by the Territory of Indiana. An Act regulating the Practice in the General
Court, and Court of Common Please, and for other purposes, Approved September 17,
1807, in THE LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY 1801–1809 443–59 (Francis S. Philbrick,
ed. 1930).
297. HOWE, supra note 294, at 80.
298. HOUCK, supra note 171, at 182.
299. The Missouri pleading law shares language, concepts, and structure of both Aus-
tin’s law and the 1836 Texas pleading law, so it is likely related to them. McKnight, Spanish
Influence on Texas Pleading, supra note 3, at 28 (finding the Spanish source law of a Texas
venue law by observing similarities in language, content, and structure); BATIZA, supra
note 91, at 13–14 (determining the sources of Louisiana law by noting verbatim and near-
verbatim language between various laws); PASCAL, supra note 93, at 608–15 (relying pri-
marily on commonalities of substance between two laws to determine whether one was the
source of the other). There was also an opportunity for Austin to have learned the Missouri
law through his association with Geyer and his experience with the laws of Missouri. See
Baade, Spanish Formalities, supra note 30, at 733 n.345 (finding the Spanish sources of
Texas mortgage laws by noting shared language and probative circumstantial evidence).
There are, however, no reported Texas appellate court cases that have identified the plead-
ing provision of this work as a source of Texas pleading law. See Rabalais, supra note 89, at
1497–1505 (identifying the Spanish, French, and common law sources of Louisiana law by
compiling lists of court decisions that cite source laws).
300. Compare Act approved Dec. 22, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., § 8, 1836–37 Repub. Tex.
Laws 198, 201, in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1258, 1261, with An Act to Regulate Proceed-
ings in the District Courts, Institution of Suits, approved May 13, 1846, 1st Cong., R.S.,
1846–1847 Repub. Tex. Laws 363, in GAMMEL, supra note 7, at 1671.
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a system of pleading in Texas.”301 Accordingly, the Legislature amended
the Texas pleading law in 1879, this time with a few substantive changes
from the 1846 law:
1879 Texas Pleading Law1846 Texas Pleading Law
The pleadings in all civil suits in the dis-[T]he petition may be filed by the plaintiff
trict and county courts shall be by petitionor attorney, and shall set forth clearly the
and answer. The pleadings in said courtsnames of the parties and their residence, if
shall be in writing and signed by the party,known, with a full and clear statement of
or by his attorney, and filed with the clerkthe cause of action and such other allega-
of the court. The pleadings shall consist oftions, pertinent to the cause, as he may
a statement, in logical and legal form, ofdeem necessary to sustain the suit, and
the facts constituting the plaintiff’s causealso a full statement of the nature of the
of action, or the defendant’s ground ofrelief he requests of the court. . . . It shall
defense.303be the duty of the clerk, when a petition is
The petition shall set forth clearly thefiled, and the regulations herein before
names of the parties and their residences,provided are complied with, to issue a writ
if known, with a full and clear statementor citation, directed to the sheriff or other
of the cause of action, and such other alle-proper officer of the county or counties in
gations, pertinent to the cause, as thewhich the petition alleges that the defen-
plaintiff may deem necessary to sustain hisdant or defendants are, requiring him to
suit, and without any distinction betweensummon the defendants to appear at the
suits at law and in equity, and shall alsoproper term of the court, then and there
state the nature of the relief which heto answer the plaintiff’s petition, a certi-
requests of the court.304fied copy of which shall accompany each
writ or citation. . . .302
The 1879 law added the requirement that “pleadings shall consist of a
statement, in logical and legal form, of the facts constituting the plaintiff’s
cause of action.”305 This language is from common law pleading trea-
tises.306 This new common law language overlaid the existing equity lan-
guage and concepts of the previous Texas pleading laws.307 Texas
301. William V. Dorsaneo, III, The History of Texas Civil Procedure, 65 BAYLOR L.
REV. 713, 719 (2013) (quoting O.M. ROBERTS, THE ELEMENTS OF TEXAS PLEADING 12–16
(1890)).
302. An Act to Regulate Proceedings in the District Courts, Institution of Suits, ap-
proved May 13, 1846, 1st Cong., R.S., §§ 5, 9, 1846–1847 Repub. Tex. Laws 363, in GAM-
MEL, supra note 7, at 1671–72.
303. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ARTS. 1185–87 (1879) (punctuation and internal notations
changed).
304. Id. Art. 1195 (punctuation and internal notations changed, part of subdivision (b)
removed because it was irrelevant).
305. Id. Art. 1187 (punctuation and internal notations changed).
306. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT., 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
225 n.1 (New York 1848). Professor William Dorsaneo has concluded that this phrase is
evidence that the Texas pleading rule resembled Code Pleading. DORSANEO, supra note
301, at 720 (citing CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 7,
at 21–23 (2d ed. 1947)). Code pleading is different from common law pleading in many
ways, but the New York Superior Court has held that, although the phrase “statement in a
logical and legal form of the facts which constitution the plaintiff’s cause of action” comes
from the common law, it is no different from a requirement in the New York Field Code–a
famous example of code pleading–that a statement contain “a plain and concise statement
of the facts constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition.” Dows and Carey
v. Hotchkiss, N.Y. Supreme Court, Munroe County, 1852, in 10 THE NEW YORK LEGAL
OBSERVER 284 (1852).
307. SAYLES, supra note <CITE _Ref494566977“>, at 390–91.
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pleading therefore resembled common law pleading in part, and equity in
part, creating increased technicality, formality, and incongruity.308 The
desire to simplify and systematize Texas pleading rules culminated in
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 45 and 47, which the Texas Supreme
Court promulgated in 1941.309The committee that drafted Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 45 and 47 said the new language came from Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8.310
Rule 8 is based on former Federal Equity Rule 25.311 Compare them
with the 1941 version of the new Texas pleading rules:
Federal Rule of Civil Proce- Texas Rules of Civil Proce-Federal Equity Rule 25 (1918)
dure 8 dure 45 and 47 (1941)[A] bill in equity shall con-
A pleading that states a claim Pleadings in the district andtain, in addition to the usual
for relief must contain: a short county courts shall be by peti-caption: first, the full name,
and plain statement of the tion and answer; consist of awhen known, of each plaintiff
grounds for the court’s juris- statement in plain and conciseand defendant, and the citi-
diction, unless the court language of the plaintiff’szenship and residence of each
already has jurisdiction and cause of action or the defen-party. Second, a short and
the claim needs no new juris- dant’s grounds of defense. . . ;plain statement of the grounds
dictional support; a short and contain any other matterupon which the court’s juris-
plain statement of the claim which may be required by lawdiction depends. Third, a short
showing that the pleader is or rule authorizing or regulat-and simple statement of the
entitled to relief; and a ing any particular action orultimate facts upon which the
demand for the relief sought, defense; be in writing, signedplaintiff asks relief, omitting
which may include relief in by the party or his attorney,any mere statement of evi-
the alternative or different and be filed with the clerk.dence.312
types of relief.313 All pleadings shall be so con-
strued as to do substantial jus-
tice.314 A pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief,
whether an original petition,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third party claim, shall contain
a short statement of the cause
of action sufficient to give fair
notice of the claim involved,
and a demand for judgment
for the relief to which the
party deems himself enti-
tled.315
308. See Mateer v. Cockrill, 45 S.W. 751, 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref’d) (noting
that the 1879 Texas pleading law is “very analogous to those which obtain in the courts of
equity of England and of the United States”). See also SAYLES, supra note 136, at 390–91.
309. DORSANEO, supra note 301, at 721.
310. Id. at 739.
311. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (annotations).
312. In 1918, Federal Equity Rule 24 provided that every “pleading shall be signed by a
solicitor certifying that ‘no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; and that it is not
instituted for delay.’” JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 82, 86
(1918).
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
314. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (1942), TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 45. The annota-
tions provide: “Source: This rule embraces in part Art. 1997, Texas Rules 1 and 32 (for the
District and County Courts), and Federal Rule 8(f). Change: No change in Art. 1997 except
the addition of the final sentence and the elimination, in paragraph two, of the requirement
that the allegations be statements of fact.”
315. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (1942), TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 47. The annota-
tions provide: “Source: Federal Rule 8(a). Change: Omission of the Federal requirement
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Former Federal Equity Rule 25 is based on former Federal Equity
Rules 20 and 26, which were promulgated in 1842,316 and were based on
orders of the English High Court of Chancery.317
The annotations to Rules 20 and 26 discuss prohibitions against “im-
pertinence” and “scandal” at length.318 They explain that these prohibi-
tions are
necessary to the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is
one of the inherent powers of a court of chancery, which has been
exercised without question since the establishment of such courts.
Prolixity, tautology, scandal, and impertinence have been among the
common faults of bills in equity time out of mind.319
The annotations even mention the Lord Chancellor’s order that “no
sheet should contain more than 15 lines, and an excess of the allotted
quantity furnished good ground for demurrer.”320 Rules 20 and 26 are
therefore strikingly similar to Livingston’s 1805 law, which was based on
precisely the same equity sources as the old Federal Rules of Equity.
Livingston’s 1805 LawFederal Equity Rules (c. 1842–1911)
All suits in the superior court shall beEvery bill, in the introductory part thereof,
commenced by petition, addressed to theshall contain the names, places of abode
court, which shall state the names of theand citizenship of all the parties, plaintiffs
parties, their places of residence, and theand defendants, by and against whom the
cause of action, with the necessary circum-bill is brought. The form, in substance,
stances of places and dates, and shall con-shall be as follows: “To the Judges of the
clude with a prayer for relief, adapted toCircuit Court of the United States for the
the circumstances of the case. And everyDistrict of ___: A. B. of ___, and a citizen
such petition shall be free from unneces-of the State of ___, brings this his bill
sary prolixity, and from any matter scan-against C. D. of ___, and a citizen of the
dalous, libellous, or impertinent, and shallState of ___, and E. F. of ___, and a citi-
be filed with the clerk, whose duty it shallzen of the State of ___. And thereupon
be to endorse thereon the day on whichyour orator complains.”
the same is filed. [A]fter filing such peti-Every bill shall be expressed in as brief
tion, the clerk shall on the request of theand succinct terms as it reasonably can be,
petitioner or his attorney, make a fairand shall contain no unnecessary recitals
transcript of the same, together with aof deeds, documents, contracts, or other
citation in the following form: Mr. A. B.instruments, in haec verba, or any other
you are hereby summoned to appear atimpertinent matter, or any scandalous mat-
the ___ and comply with the prayer of theter not relevant to the suit.321
annexed petition, or file your answer
thereto, in writing, in the office of the
clerk of the superior court, at ___ in ___
days after service thereof. Witness C.D.
presiding
that jurisdictional grounds be stated. The Federal Rule requires ‘a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ for which wording that of
subdivision (a) above has been substituted.”
316. Hopkins, supra note 312, at 47, 48.
317. Id. at 164.
318. Id. at 88 (citing Sanborn, J. in Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 Fed. Rep. 55, 29 (C.C.A. 14).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 82 (for Rule 20) and 88 (for Rule 26).
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In this way, the current Texas pleading rule is based on English equity
from two sources: the 1836 Texas pleading law, which was based on Aus-
tin’s and Livingston’s laws, both of which were written in the language of
equity; and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were based on
Federal Equity Rules and Chancery practice of England. But equity
might not be the only source of the current Texas pleading law.
Promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the early 1920s
was the culmination of a broader movement to simplify, and then codify,
civil procedure.322 In an early stage of that movement, New York enacted
a systematic codification of its law in 1848, now known as the Field
Code.323 Its pleading provision is an example of what has become known
as code pleading.324
Some legal scholars have concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are descended from the Field Code and Livingston’s Louisiana
law:
The movement in favor of a clear, simple, and concise method of
practice began with the criticisms of Bentham very early in the cen-
tury, and resulted, first, in the adoption of the Code of Procedure of
Louisiana, as drafted by Edward Livingston, and subsequently, in
1846, in the New York Code of Procedure, as drafted by David Dud-
ley Field and adopted and continued for a period of nearly thirty
years.325
Some scholars have claimed that anyone “familiar with Edward Living-
ston’s efforts toward simplification of procedure in Louisiana will rise
from a study of the new Federal Rules with a feeling that his spirit has
helped to guide and direct the work of the Supreme Court Commit-
tee.”326 The “connection between [Livingston’s] Louisiana codes and the
movement for codification having its home in New York and spreading
thence, in the matter of practice and procedure at least, to a majority of
the several States . . . seems obvious.”327
Certainly, very few scholars have concluded that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are descended from Livingston via the Field Code; some
have even concluded that the Federal Rules are not descended from the
Field Code at all.328 Nevertheless, the language and concepts in the Liv-
ingston, Field Code, and Federal provisions are very similar. The Field
Code required that a complaint contain “[a] statement of the facts consti-
tuting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repe-
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tition,’”329 and if “irrelevant or redundant matter be inserted in a
pleading, it may be stricken out.”330 Like Livingston’s 1805 pleading law,
the Field Code’s simple pleading system, and the language it used, was
based on English equity.331 Consequently, the Field Code’s language re-
sembles the language in the 1825 Louisiana Code of Practice, which Liv-
ingston wrote, and which replaced his 1805 Practice Act.332 The 1825
Louisiana law’s pleading provision required that the petition “contain a
clear and concise statement of the object of the demand, as well as of the
nature of the title, or the cause of action on which it is founded; it must
not contain any insulting or impertinent expression.”333 The federal rules
require that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and for the plaintiff’s relief.334 Their
common language and requirements are evidence that the Livingston,
New York, and Federal laws are closely related to one another, appar-
ently in a single line of descent. And because Texas pleading came from
Austin’s pleading law, and Austin’s law came from Livingston’s, Texas
pleading would be both a descendent of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure through the Texas rule amendments in 1941, and an ancestor of the
Federal Rules through Livingston and the Field Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
A fair summary of the genealogy of today’s Texas pleading rules is
therefore something like this:
Today’s Texas pleading rule is descended, separately, from five differ-
ent legal sources, each of which is related to all the others. One, Texas
pleading came from English equity through Edward Livingston’s 1805
Orleans Territory Practice Act, Stephen F. Austin’s 1824 alcalde codes,
and the 1836 Texas pleading law. Two, Livingston and Austin drafted
their pleading laws in a way that rejected common law pleading, and that
was not inconsistent with the appearance of Spanish practice. Three,
Texas pleading came from English equity through the High Court of
Chancery in England, the former Federal Equity Rules, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Four, equity came from canon law and the civil
law, which are source laws of Spanish pleading. And Five, early Texas
pleading was a very early event in the movement to simplify judicial pro-
cedure, which used features common to Spanish pleading and equity to
replace the complexity of common law procedure.
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That is very different from the traditional story of the origin of the
Texas pleading system. Perhaps someone will find additional evidence—a
document at an archive in Madrid, or some textual clue that other readers
have seen before but misunderstood—that will rewrite the story again.
The evidence is probably out there. In the tradition of Professor Mc-
Knight: let’s go find it.
